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Monday, October 31, 2005

Castro regime bans "counter-revolutionary" Czech reception at Havana hotel

[31.10.2005] - Current Affairs - Rob Cameron
Castro regime bans "counter-revolutionary" Czech reception at Havana hotel

Relations between the Czech Republic and Cuba have long been cool, but
the thermometer dropped a few more degrees on Friday, following an
incident in the Cuban capital. Czech diplomats had been planning to
celebrate Czechoslovak independence day at a Havana hotel, but the
reception was banned at the last minute by the Cuban authorities.
Havana Havana
Czechs and Slovaks celebrated independence day on Friday, the 87th
anniversary of the foundation of the independent Czechoslovak state. The
Czech embassy in Havana had booked a luxury hotel to celebrate the
event, and invited a number of Cuban and foreign guests. But it was the
invitations issued to twenty so-called "Ladies in White" - wives and
relatives of Cuban political prisoners - which angered the Castro
regime, and at the last minute the reception, dubbed
"counter-revolutionary" by the Cuban authorities, was banned.
Kristina Prunerova works at the People in Need human rights group, and
is also secretary of the International Committee for Democracy in Cuba
(ICDC). She told Radio Prague the ban had come as no surprise:
"I think this is a typical reaction of a totalitarian regime, such as
the regime of Fidel Castro. They're trying to prohibit any activity that
would go against the regime. Obviously they don't want the world to know
about the opposition, so they're trying to eliminate the contacts. And
this was probably the reason why they tried to stop the celebration in
the hotel in Havana."
Fidel Castro Fidel Castro
An impromptu reception was later held at the Czech Ambassador's
residence, attended by a number of EU ambassadors. The Czech government
has made Cuba a foreign policy priority, opposing attempts within the EU
to take a more conciliatory stance towards the Castro regime. Kristina
Prunerova says many Czechs - who spent four decades living under
Communism - feel a moral obligation to promote human rights and
democracy in Cuba.
"I think the most important fact is the common history that we share
with Cubans, because we also lived under the Communist regime and a
strong totalitarian regime such as the one Fidel Castro is running in
Cuba. We feel solidarity, because we were also helped from abroad and
that solidarity was very important to us. Now we're trying to help in
Cuba in that same way."
The Czech Republic is fighting something of a lonely battle within the
EU on Cuba. However Czech diplomats have been encouraged by the recent
support of several EU countries for a resolution condemning human rights
abuses in Cuba in the United Nations human rights commission. Both the
Czech government and NGOs hope the EU itself is slowly swinging towards
adopting a unified position on Cuba.

(Radio Prague made several attempts to speak to the Cuban charge
d'affaires this morning, but was told she was not available for interview).

http://www.radio.cz/en/article/72198

Se lanza Castro contra "nuevos ricos" cubanos

Lunes 31 de octubre de 2005

Se lanza Castro contra "nuevos ricos" cubanos

Impone rígidos controles en gasolineras para frenar el mercado negro de
combustible

GERARDO ARREOLA CORRESPONSAL

La Habana, 30 de octubre. El presidente Fidel Castro anunció una campaña
contra "los nuevos ricos" cubanos y "sus cómplices", con punto de
partida en un rígido control de la venta de combustible en las
gasolineras de esta capital y en la vecina provincia de Pinar del Río.

La semana pasada Castro apareció en dos programas de televisión y luego
habló en una graduación de bachilleres de arte. En las tres
intervenciones el mandatario hizo breves comentarios a la campaña, que
irrumpió sin anuncio el sábado 16 de este mes.

Ese día los despachadores habituales de las gasolineras, llamados
pisteros, fueron enviados a su casa sin explicación oficial. Su lugar
junto a las bombas fue tomado por jóvenes trabajadores sociales.

Castro sólo ha tocado en forma indirecta el origen de esa decisión: la
sospecha gubernamental de que los empleados de Cuba Petróleo (Cupet)
sustraen ilícitamente combustible y lo revenden a bajo precio.

En este caso, según el lenguaje empleado por el presidente cubano, "los
nuevos ricos" son los clientes de ese segmento del mercado negro, que
"corrompen" a sus "cómplices", los pisteros.

El comercio ilegal es una práctica ampliamente extendida, que en una
economía como la cubana, de fuertes regulaciones y centralización
estatal, termina realizándose a costa de las arcas públicas.

La campaña de los trabajadores sociales permitirá "crear las condiciones
necesarias para que los nuevos ricos paguen el combustible que realmente
consumen", dijo Castro en una intervención.

Esa frase parece aludir a un posible aumento en el precio al consumidor
de la gasolina y el diesel. El líder cubano señaló que su gabinete
económico tiene adoptadas "13 medidas" vinculadas a la campaña, pero
omitió precisiones.

Los combustibles han subido de precio en dos rondas recientes, en mayo
de 2004 y en enero pasado. En el caso del diesel el precio se elevó 66
por ciento en ese lapso.

Los actuales jóvenes despachadores levantan un registro de la matrícula
de cada automóvil que carga combustible, que el usuario debe pagar
previamente en la caja registradora, en una operación que provoca
congestiones en las gasolineras.

Los trabajadores sociales "hacen grandes ahorros de combustible, con
sumas importantes para el país", señaló Castro. Esos recursos se están
"salvando de las manos desgraciadas de los nuevos ricos y sus
cómplices", y hasta "se ha descubierto depósitos privados de combustible".

Tras la crisis económica que siguió en Cuba al colapso de la Unión
Soviética y una limitada apertura a mecanismos de mercado, en la década
pasada, las desigualdades sociales en la isla se acentuaron en ambos
extremos.

En los años noventa hubo campañas contra los entonces llamados macetas
(por los mazos de dinero que acumulaban). En la misma línea, Castro
criticó este año a los paladares (restaurantes familiares) y los taxis
privados, dos de los giros autorizados por la ley para el trabajo por
cuenta propia. Sin embargo, el gobierno no había empleado la expresión
"nuevos ricos" para aludir a un sector de la sociedad.

http://www.jornada.unam.mx/2005/10/31/052n1mun.php

Brazil President's Party Secretly Got $3 Million From Cuba, Magazine Says

October 31, 2005
Brazil President's Party Secretly Got $3 Million From Cuba, Magazine Says
By LARRY ROHTER

RIO DE JANEIRO, Oct. 31 - During Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva's successful
presidential campaign in 2002, his Workers' Party received up to $3
million in illegal campaign contributions from the government of Cuba,
according to the cover story in the current issue of Brazil's leading
weekly newsmagazine.

The report, which both the governing party and the Cuban government have
denied, has reignited the wide-ranging corruption scandal that has
paralyzed President da Silva's government for nearly six months. After a
month of muted complaints that conveyed a sense that the worst was over,
opposition leaders have reacted with threats of a new, politically
exhausting investigation and even impeachment proceedings.

"This is a serious occurrence in every respect," Senator Tasso
Jereisatti, a leader of the center-left Brazilian Social Democratic
Party, said in an interview with the O Estado de São Paulo newspaper,
noting that Brazilian law forbids campaign donations from foreign
sources. "If it is proven, the president is going to have no alternative
- he will not have the conditions to be able to govern, he'll have to
give up his job."

The report in Veja magazine did not say how the money, said to be cash
in American dollars, was transported from Cuba to Brazil. But it quoted
two party functionaries, both former aides to Antonio Palocci, who was a
senior member of Mr. da Silva's campaign team and is now the minister of
finance, as saying the money had been delivered by a Cuban diplomat,
hidden in cases of Johnny Walker whiskey and flown to Mr. da Silva's
campaign headquarters.

Vladimir Poleto, an economist, who identified himself as a courier for
one shipment of money, said in the magazine account, "I took a plane
from Brasilia bound for São Paulo with three boxes of liquor," adding,
"Afterwards, I learned that there was money in one of the boxes."

Mr. da Silva, who has maintained all along that he was unaware that a
multimillion-dollar slush fund was being used to buy the support of
members of Congress and to pay his media adviser's bills off the books,
has not yet commented directly on the accusation. But the president of
the Workers' Party, Ricardo Berzoini, dismissed the Veja report as false
and politically motivated.

"It's completely baseless," he said. "Veja is acting like a front of
attack on the government and not as a journalistic publication."

The Cuban government, which funneled money to selected guerrilla groups
and left-wing parties in Latin America through the 1980's but which now
says it a moribund economy has led it to abandon the practice, also
denied the report in emphatic terms.

In a statement, the Cuban Embassy in Brasilia described the Veja article
as part of "an orchestrated campaign of lies" motivated by the
"aggressive plans of imperialism against Cuba and against Lula."

Veja is Brazil's most widely read publication, with a circulation of
over 1.2 million copies weekly. The magazine published the first story
detailing a corruption scheme in Mr. da Silva's administration in May,
and has followed up with numerous other ground-breaking articles that
have subsequently proven to be accurate.

In March, before the current scandal broke, Veja published a report
saying that Workers' Party members had discussed a $5 million donation
with representatives of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, a
guerrilla group that earns money from drug trafficking and kidnapping.
That report was also vehemently denied, but a congressional
investigation later confirmed the existence of intelligence documents
indicating those contacts had occurred.

Relations between Fidel Castro and Mr. da Silva and the Workers' Party
have always been cordial. The president's closest aide, José Dirceu de
Oliveira e Silva, who was president of the party during the 2002
campaign, was exiled for several years decades ago in Cuba, where he
received military and intelligence training. And on one visit, an
admiring Mr. da Silva told the Cuban dictator, "Thank you Fidel Castro,
thank you for existing."

Initially, the corruption scandal, the worst in modern Brazilian
history, left Mr. da Silva, who ran on a government platform and will be
up for re-election in less than a year, very much on the defensive. Not
only has Mr. Dirceu resigned, but the president, secretary general and
treasurer of the Workers' Party have also been forced to step down.

But since the election last month of a member of the Communist Party of
Brazil, Aldo Rabelo, a da Silva ally, as president of the lower house of
Congress, the tide seemed to have shifted somewhat.

Mr. da Silva's standing in the polls has stopped falling, and he and his
staff and supporters have stepped up their criticism of the three
congressional investigations looking into corruption, calling the probes
partisan witch-hunts meant to destabilize Latin America's largest nation.

"By trying to criminalize the Workers' Party and President Lula, the
opposition could lead the country to a very negative climate," said
Jaques Wagner, Mr. da Silva's chief political operative. "This climate
of raising permanent suspicions about the party and President Lula
himself is not good for Brazilian democracy."

http://www.nytimes.com/2005/10/31/international/01brazilcnd.html

Brazil Opposition Seeks Probe Into Alleged Cuba Payments

Brazil Opposition Seeks Probe Into Alleged Cuba Payments

10-31-05 09:32 AM EST

SAO PAULO -(Dow Jones)- Brazilian opposition leaders will demand a
congressional investigation into allegations that the Cuban government
made an illegal contribution of up to $3 million to the campaign to
elect President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva in 2002, local newspapers
reported Monday.

The latest allegation of illicit financing within the governing Workers'
Party, or PT, was published Saturday in the current affairs magazine
Veja, and it has fortified opposition calls for impeachment proceedings
to be opened against the president following a deluge of corruption
charges surrounding his party.

For the last five months, the Lula government has been embroiled in a
scandal triggered by alleged illicit contributions to political
campaigns, the stripping of funds from public companies and the payment
of congress members to support the government in key legislative votes.

A congressional inquiry will look into whether the Cuban money,
allegedly delivered to the PT in whisky and rum boxes, can be traced in
the accounts of the publicists used during the 2002 presidential
election campaign, said the local daily O Estado De Sao Paulo.

The Cuban embassy called the allegations untrue and libelous in a press
release.

Until recently, the main opposition parties, the Social Democratic
Party, or PSDB, and the Liberal Front Party, or PFL, have sought to
preserve Lula from the scandal, focusing their investigations on other
PT leaders.

However, polls showing that Lula's popularity is recovering, despite the
scandal, and PT attacks on the PSDB over the alleged illegal financing
of a campaign for governor in the southeast state of Minas Gerais have
led the opposition to refocus their ire on the president.

For Lula's part, he warned that the government could counterattack - if
impeachment proceeds - by seeking to bring allegations of illegal
campaign payments and payments for votes by other parties to the fore.

-By Alastair Stewart, Dow Jones Newswires; 5511 3145 1479;
alastair.stewart@ dowjones.com

(END) Dow Jones Newswires

10-31-050932ET

Copyright (c) 2005 Dow Jones & Company, Inc.

http://news.morningstar.com/news/DJ/M10/D31/200510310932DOWJONESDJONLINE000386.html

Some fear for families of Cuban choir defectors

Some fear for families of Cuban choir defectors

CTV.ca News Staff

Updated: Sun. Oct. 30 2005 7:20 AM ET

A Cuban choir is 11 members short following defections in Canada, and
some people are afraid that could mean repercussions for family members
who remain in the communist country.

The Coro Nacional de Cuba has been performing in Canada, and is ending
its tour with a Saturday performance in Vancouver.

During their visit to Toronto last Sunday, 11 singers defected and are
now in hiding. They made their escape from a city hotel with the help of
the Cuban–Canadian Foundation.

"They are in a safe house, enjoying freedom, getting help from the Cuban
community," the foundation's Ismael Sambra tells CTV News.

The choice to defect to Canada comes at a deep cost because family
members are permanently left behind. That tough decision is made more
difficult by concerns that loved ones still in Cuba could be targeted by
the government.

"The danger could be maybe the family will be arrested because of the
choice of their relatives. They could be intimidated," says Amnesty
International's Kamau Ngugi.

It's a claim the Cuban government denies.

"No one in Cuba has been prosecuted because someone decided to remain
out of Cuba because of their beliefs," says Ambassador Ernesto Senti Darias.

Still, the 11 defectors remain out of sight, and their choir continues
to perform.

On Saturday, the remaining choir members were to perform with the
Vancouver Chamber Choir.

The Cuban choir director defends her homeland. Digna Guerra Ramirez told
CTV News Vancouver that Cuba offers many freedoms. Plus she says her
choir's tour and the cultural message they are bringing to Canada have
not been affected by her singers' sudden departure.

With a report CTV News Vancouver's Renu Bakshi

© Copyright 2002-2006 Bell Globemedia Inc.

http://www.ctv.ca/servlet/ArticleNews/story/CTVNews/20051029/cuban_choir_051029/20051029?hub=Canada

Venezuela has financed USD 850 million to Cuba

Over 100 million barrels shipped under integral cooperation agreement
Venezuela has financed USD 850 million to Cuba

MARIANNA PARRAGA
EL UNIVERSAL

Few people could deny that a so-called integral cooperation agreement
Cuba and Venezuela initialed in October 2000 -whose first five-year term
elapsed last Sunday- has been more than a mere oil supply deal.

Under this instrument, healthcare programs known as Barrio Adentro and
Milagro were created; Cuban professional have played a series of roles
in Venezuela, while Venezuelan students have taken studies in Cuba, just
to mention a few results local authorities have praised once and again.

The agreement -which appears to benefit Fidel Castro's regime much more
than President Hugo Chávez' intended revolution- has been the target of
harsh criticism. Such rejection, however, has not undermined the deal.

Actually, this year Energy and Petroleum Minister Rafael Ramírez
conceded that Venezuelan oil shipments to Cuba went from 53,000 bpd -as
originally agreed- to an average of 98,000 bpd.

In this way, at the end of the agreement first five-year term, Venezuela
delivered some 100.42 million barrels of oil and by-products worth USD
3.38 billion.

Since the deal provides for long-term financing that varies depending on
the Venezuelan oil prices, based on the average Venezuelan oil prices in
2000-2005, it can be asserted that Venezuela has financed some USD 850
million to Cuba. Under the agreement, this amount is to be repaid in 15
years, with a two-year grace period at a yearly interest rate of 1 percent.

Black hole
The part of the oil sales subject to long-term financing averaged 25.2
percent over the last five years, and it was guaranteed with promissory
notes from the Cuban national bank whose fate is still uncertain.

Former officials of the Venezuelan Finance Ministry claim that the
present net value of this long-term loan is around 50 percent.
Therefore, for USD 850 million being financed to Cuba in 15 years,
Venezuela is to be repaid USD 425 million in real terms. Practically,
this loss can be translated into a discount of USD 4.25 per each barrel
of oil sold since 2000.

These figures were estimated based on the hypothesis that Cuba has
timely repaid the part of the loan subject to short-term financing,
which represents most of the sales. Until 2003, however, Cuba had a debt
of USD 651 million for delays in 90-day payments, following debt
refinancing in 2002.

When President Hugo Chávez launched Venezuela-Caribbean oil trade
agreement Petrocaribe, Caracas offered Cuba the possibility to migrate
to the new instrument, which provides for even more flexible terms and
conditions.

Ramírez described as "cordiality" the fact that Cuba rejected this
proposal. But such a decision can be interpreted otherwise: while
Petrocaribe is an agreement with equal loan terms for 12 countries,
Cuba-Venezuela deal is plagued with secrecy.

Translated by Maryflor Suárez R.

http://www.eluniversal.com/2005/10/31/en_eco_art_31A625139.shtml

Cuba: la sucesion que se pierde en el horizonte

Posted on Sun, Oct. 30, 2005

PRIMERO DE UNA SERIE
Cuba: la sucesión que se pierde en el horizonte

CARLOS ALBERTO MONTANER
Especial para El Nuevo Herald

Tras la muerte de Fidel Castro, los términos de la disyuntiva que se
erguía ante el pueblo cubano parecían ser una sucesión sin fisuras del
castrismo, como sucedió en Corea del Norte, o una transición hacia la
democracia y la economía de mercado, como ocurrió en la Europa del Este
después de la caída del Muro de Berlín.

Sorpresivamente, ese panorama ha cambiado de un modo drástico con la
aparición de un nuevo fenómeno: la alianza entre Castro y el presidente
venezolano Hugo Chávez.

Hasta hace tres años, Raúl Castro; su yerno, el coronel Luis Alberto
Rodríguez; los generales Julio Casas, Abelardo Colomé Ibarra, Ulises del
Toro y Alvaro López Miera, y los políticos y funcionarios Carlos Lage,
Felipe Pérez Roque, Ricardo Alarcón, Francisco Soberón, Fernando Remírez
de Estenoz, más el resto de los herederos menores del poder de Castro,
discretamente habían diseñado su hoja de ruta para gobernar el país
otros 20 años tras la muerte del Comandante.

Se trataba del plan de sucesión que se llevaría a cabo tras el entierro
glorioso de Castro y de la pública declaración de adhesión
inquebrantable y eterna a la memoria y a la ideología del Máximo Líder.

El proyecto era muy simple, y, desde la perspectiva de la clase
dirigente, parecía viable. Una vez enterrado con honores el Comandante
-- acaso en el Cacahual, junto a Antonio Maceo y a Blas Roca, donde
queda una tumba disponible, o en la Plaza de la Revolución, dentro de la
siniestra tradición leninista, con momia acristalada incluida --, se
iniciaba una apertura económica a lo China o a lo Vietnam, con
relaciones estrechas con las naciones desarrolladas de Occidente,
permitiendo tímidamente la gradual aparición de la pequeña propiedad
privada entre los cubanos, pero manteniendo simultáneamente un rígido
control político y económico, de manera que no se les escapara de las
manos el manejo del país.

Todos ellos sabían que, para poder llevar a cabo pacíficamente esa
transformación, necesitaban normalizar las relaciones con Estados Unidos
y, en menor medida, con la Unión Europea. Así que para lograr ese
objetivo, que incluía el levantamiento del embargo (una clarísima señal
externa e interna de legitimación), los herederos de Castro,
aparentemente, estaban dispuestos a ofrecerle tres recompensas a
Washington: el control de la emigración clandestina, vigilancia sobre el
narcotráfico, y una disminución del rol de Cuba como estandarte de la
lucha anticapitalista y antiamericana. O sea: tranquilidad en el
vecindario y una educada cordialidad internacional que ponía fin a medio
siglo de intranquilidad y discordia.

Además de esas recompensas reales, para facilitar el cambio de la
política americana y europea, los herederos de Castro también estaban
maquillando un escenario simbólico más aceptable para los principios y
valores occidentales. Desde hacía varios años, la Seguridad del Estado
había construido o manipulado a ciertos grupos de oposición, dentro y
fuera de Cuba, para, en su momento, poder transmitir la impresión de
conceder un mayor pluralismo político, donde habría supuestos demócratas
razonables y moderados, dispuestos a desempeñar el dulce papel de una
oposición tranquila y obediente, fiel a las instituciones nacionales, y
circunscrita a los minúsculos y muy vigilados espacios de acción cedidos
por el gobierno dentro de la estricta legalidad vigente.

En ese escenario político de cartón piedra, como aquellas hermosas
aldeas Potemkin diseñadas para engañar a la zarina Catalina la Grande
presentándole una idílica visión de la paupérrima Rusia rural, algunos
de estos grupos de la oposición manejados por la Seguridad se
incardinarían a las grandes familias políticas internacionales --
democristianos, socialistas, liberales --, y contribuirían a legitimar
un sistema en el que la tolerancia a la diversidad ideológica sería más
virtual que real, pero suficiente para contentar a esos actores
internacionales permanentemente proclives a dar por bueno cualquier
síntoma menor de apertura que aflorara en la Isla, aunque fuera
fraudulento o estuviera totalmente mediatizado.

Los herederos pragmáticos

En todo caso, el proyecto de los herederos era reintroducir a Cuba, muy
lentamente, en un sistema híbrido de socialismo con elementos de
mercado, fuertemente intervenido y controlado por el Estado, donde la
clase dirigente -- el entorno de Raúl Castro -- tuviera un férreo
control de la maquinaria económica, política y militar que le
garantizara el disfrute del poder durante dos generaciones más. En ese
largo período, el Partido Comunista, pausadamente, se iría convirtiendo
en una especie de PRI hegemónico hasta que la Isla, en algún momento
todavía imprevisible, arribaría a un perfil de aceptable normalidad para
los estándares internacionales.

Para esas fechas, todos los protagonistas de la revolución estarían
enterrados y sus descendientes tendrían asegurada su pertenencia a la
clase dirigente que habría surgido en la nación. No existiría peligro
para ellos ni sus familiares.

Por otra parte, desde el punto de vista ideológico, ese proyecto
encajaba con el pragmatismo de unos dirigentes que, a partir de la
perestroika y de la desaparición de la URSS, habían perdido toda ilusión
con el marxismo y con el internacionalismo revolucionario que Castro les
había impuesto a lo largo de casi medio siglo de sangrientas y alocadas
aventuras.

Los generales y oficiales que habían pasado por los 15 años de guerras
africanas y por múltiples episodios guerrilleros en América Latina, se
sentían más cómodos administrando hoteles, fabricando contenedores o
importando computadoras que dedicados a la improbable tarea de construir
un paraíso proletario sobre la tierra, hazaña que, como habían
comprobado, no sólo era imposible, sino que resultaba inútil y
ruinosamente costosa.

Sin embargo, a pesar de esa realista, madura y devastadora evaluación de
la revolución, para poder transformar una dictadura idealista teñida por
una misión imperial en una dictadura doméstica despojada de cualquier
veleidad utópica, los herederos de Castro necesitaban un discurso moral
lo suficientemente coherente como para soportar el cambio de rumbo, y,
en consecuencia, construyeron uno, práctico y eficaz, aunque sin ningún
calado intelectual.

En el terreno político, supuestamente, era necesario mantener el sistema
de partido único, sin abrir de momento el juego democrático, para evitar
que Estados Unidos anexionara a Cuba, mientras, simultáneamente, se
hacía indispensable cerrarles el camino a los exiliados y a los
vendepatria locales asociados a ellos, siempre calificados como mafia,
para impedir que regresaran a vengarse cruelmente de los pobres cubanos
de la Isla.

Asimismo, resultaba indispensable mantener el control de la economía en
las manos de los revolucionarios para preservar los cacareados logros de
la revolución en el campo de la educación, la salud y los deportes. La
dictadura, pues, contaba con una coartada ideológica para afrontar sin
concesiones reales la nueva etapa que se avecinaba, aunque prometiendo
vagamente que en el futuro esos duros rasgos autoritarios se irían
desvaneciendo en la medida en que los peligros se disiparan.

http://www.miami.com/mld/elnuevo/news/world/cuba/13031807.htm

$850 millonesfinancoó Venezuela a Cuba

Caracas, lunes 31 de octubre, 2005
Economía

ENERGIA / 100 millones de barriles enviados por Convenio de Cooperación
$850 millones financió Venezuela a Cuba

Al término de cinco años, el instrumento de intercambio suscrito entre
Cuba y Venezuela ha servido de marco para el suministro a la Isla de
3,38 millardos de dólares en petróleo y derivados

MARIANNA PARRAGA

EL UNIVERSAL
Pocos estarían dispuestos a negar que el Convenio Integral de
Cooperación firmado entre Cuba y Venezuela en octubre de 2000, y que
ayer culminó su primer período de cinco años, ha sido mucho más que un
mero acuerdo de suministro petrolero.

Mediante este instrumento se crearon las misiones Barrio Adentro y
Milagro, profesionales cubanos han ejercido distintos roles en el país y
estudiantes venezolanos han participado en programas de estudio en la
Isla, por solo mencionar unos cuantos resultados de los cuales se
enorgullecen las autoridades locales.

Las afiladas críticas que se han formulado en torno al acuerdo, que
parece haber beneficiado mucho más al régimen de Fidel Castro que a la
revolución que intenta Hugo Chávez, no han minimizado su impacto. De
hecho, este año el ministro de Energía y Petróleo, Rafael Ramírez,
admitió que el volumen de hidrocarburos que se está enviado a la Isla
pasó de los 53 mil barriles diarios acordados inicialmente a un promedio
de 98 mil b/d.

Así es como la factura petrolera del convenio sumó al cierre de su
primer período alrededor de 3,38 millardos de dólares en total,
correspondientes a un volumen de 100,42 millones de barriles de crudo y
productos venezolanos entregados en cinco años.

Tomando en consideración que el convenio estipula un financiamiento a
largo plazo que varía dependiendo de los precios de la cesta venezolana,
se puede afirmar que de acuerdo con el promedio alcanzado por el barril
local entre los años 2000 y 2005, Venezuela le ha financiado a Cuba
alrededor de 850 millones de dólares que, según lo estipulado, serán
cancelados por la Isla en 15 años, con dos años de gracia y un interés
anual de 1%.

El hoyo negro

La porción de la factura financiable a largo plazo promedió 25,2% en los
últimos cinco años y estuvo avalada por pagarés emitidos por el Banco
Nacional de Cuba, cuyo destino _en el cual participa el Ministerio de
Finanzas_ sigue siendo incierto.

Ex gerentes de Finanzas de Pdvsa calculan que el valor presente neto de
ese crédito a largo plazo ronda 50%, lo que quiere decir que de los 850
millones de dólares financiados a 15 años Venezuela recibirá en términos
reales 425 millones de dólares. De una forma práctica se pudiera afirmar
entonces que esa pérdida se traduce en un descuento de 4,25 dólares por
cada barril vendido desde el año 2000.

Estas cifras parten de la hipótesis de que Cuba ha estado pagando
puntualmente la porción financiable a corto plazo, que es la mayor parte
de la factura. No obstante, hasta 2003 la deuda que mantenía la Isla por
atrasos en las cancelaciones a 90 días alcanzaba 651 millones de
dólares, tras una refinanciamiento de la deuda acordado en el año 2002.

Con la creación de Petrocaribe, Venezuela ofreció a Cuba la posibilidad
de migrar su factura a los términos del nuevo instrumento, cuyo esquema
de financiamiento es más flexible.

El ministro Ramírez consideró "un gesto" de los cubanos el haber
rechazado la propuesta. No obstante, se puede hacer otra interpretación:
mientras Petrocaribe es un acuerdo común a 12 naciones con las mismas
condiciones de crédito, el de Cuba-Venezuela sigue teniendo secretos.

http://deportes.eluniversal.com/2005/10/31/eco_art_31201A.shtml

Cuba busca elevar a 2.000 mlns dlrs comercio Venezuela en 2006

Cuba busca elevar a 2.000 mlns dlrs comercio Venezuela en 2006
Lunes 31 de Octubre, 2005 4:44 GMT17

LA HABANA (Reuters) - Cuba espera elevar de 1.400 a 2.000 millones de
dólares sus negocios anuales con Venezuela, el principal socio comercial
de la isla, a fines del 2006, dijo el lunes el ministro cubano de
Comercio Exterior, Raúl de la Nuez.

"Podríamos perfectamente llegar a 2.000 millones de dólares (...) Yo
pienso que si trabajamos bien, para finales del año que viene podemos
llegar a esa cifra," dijo el ministro cubano a periodistas al inaugurar
la XXIII Feria Internacional de La Habana.

La balanza comercial es totalmente favorable a Venezuela, que exporta a
la isla 1.100 millones de dólares anuales en petróleo y 300 millones en
alimentos y otros productos, dijo el ministro venezolano de Comercio
Exterior, Gustavo Márquez.

"Pienso que se puede llegar a los 2.000 millones de dólares,
definitivamente," dijo a Reuters.

El aumento sería posible en parte gracias a las importaciones de
productos metalmecánicos, petroquímicos y materiales para la
construcción de Venezuela.

"Las posibilidades son infinitas," dijo Márquez.

"Estamos abriendo otros espacios, asociaciones estratégicas para cadenas
industriales y estamos también conversando sobre la posibilidad de hacer
una empresa mixta para el transporte de hidrocarburos en el Caribe," añadió.

El ministro venezolano dijo que en lo que va del 2005 las pequeñas y
medianas empresas de su país exportaron 200 millones de dólares a Cuba.

Pero fue gracias a las exportaciones de petróleo que Venezuela desplazó
a la Unión Europea como principal socio comercial de Cuba.

Los negocios son estimulados por la sintonía política entre el
presidente cubano Fidel Castro y el venezolano Hugo Chávez.

Cuba paga el petróleo con los servicios de unos 20.000 médicos enviados
a Venezuela, además de con un programa de 150.000 operaciones de la
vista para venezolanos programadas para el 2005.

Unos 1.900 empresarios de 43 países -entre ellos Estados Unidos-
participan desde el lunes y hasta el sábado en la Feria Internacional de
La Habana.

http://lta.today.reuters.com/news/NewsArticle.aspx?type=businessNews&storyID=2005-10-31T204434Z_01_N31643496_RTRIDST_0_NEGOCIOS-COMERCIO-VENEZUELA-CUBA-SOL.XML

Israeli tourist murdered in Cuba

Israeli tourist murdered in Cuba

Victim robbed at knifepoint, stabbed to death in Havana; his body to be
returned to Israel via Canada, as Israel does not have diplomatic
relations with Cuba
Roee Nahmias

An Israeli tourist was murdered in Cuba Sunday while on vacation with
his wife.

Initial details from the Foreign Ministry in Jerusalem indicate that the
man was stabbed to death a short time after leaving his hotel in Havana.

Local police said the couple left the hotel when they were attacked by
about eight robbers. The couple was forcefully separated and the man was
taken into an alley where he was robbed and stabbed to death.

It is not yet known whether the man was killed because he attempted to
resist the criminals.

According to the Foreign Ministry, his body is to be returned to Israel
via Canada, as Israel does not have diplomatic relations with Cuba.

Many Israelis have "discovered" Cuba as an ideal vacation spot in recent
years. The communist country, headed by Fidel Castro, provides tourists
with a charming holiday, but it also has a high rate of poverty and crime.

http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3162016,00.html

Fidel Castro can't resist winking at young blondes!

Fidel Castro can't resist winking at young blondes!
London October 31, 2005 3:09:14 PM IST

Former Cuba dictator Fidel Castro might have turned 79, but that's not
'old' enough for him to give up his penchant for winking at young girls.

According to The Mirror, the Cuban Communist dictator could not resist
winking at a young blonde, who caught his eye at a graduation ceremony
for hundreds of art students in Havana.

"We're not sure what he suggested to the woman but she was so
overwhelmed by his flirting that she burst into applause. You're in
there, Fidel", said the paper. (ANI)

http://news.webindia123.com/news/showdetails.asp?id=150569&cat=World

More Vt. cows expected headed to Cuba

More Vt. cows expected headed to Cuba

October 31, 2005

MONTPELIER, Vt. --Cuban agriculture officials like the 74 Holstein and
Jersey heifers they got from Vermont in August so much that they want
more, Vermont Agriculture Secretary Steve Kerr says.

Kerr said more than 100 Vermont cows are expected to be in the mix of
some 300 from the Northeast that the Cuban government is likely to order
this week.

"Little Debbie," a Jersey heifer that was a gift from the Putney School
to the people of Cuba, as well as a Holstein from the school, are being
displayed outside a pavilion at this week's Havana Trade Fair.

Little Debbie recently gave birth to a bull, her first calf.

John Park Wright IV, a Florida businessman who has a U.S. government
license to deal with Cuba, brokered the first shipment of Vermont cows
to the Caribbean nation and is handling the new deal as well, Kerr said.

Jerseys, Brown Swiss and Holsteins from Vermont will be included under
the new agreement, Kerr said. He added that Cuban inspectors are
expected to travel to Vermont this winter to pick out the animals.

Wright will negotiate the price of the cows with individual farmers.
Kerr said the average for the last load was $2,100, but milk prices are
beginning to decline, and livestock prices may follow suit.

"I don't have a clue," Kerr said of the prices the new round of animals
might fetch. "It's whatever the market will bear."

Kerr said the fact that the two Vermont cows were being displayed
outside the trade pavilion was a sign that the Cubans value the Vermont
animals.

"The two cows are from Vermont and we're very proud and the Putney
School should be very proud," Kerr said.

Aside from cows, Cuba last year said it would buy powdered milk and
4,000 bushels of Vermont apples. The apple sale has been stalled because
Cuban inspectors have run into trouble getting visas from the U.S. State
Department.

http://www.boston.com/news/local/vermont/articles/2005/10/31/more_vt_cows_expected_headed_to_cuba/

More Vermont cows may be calling Cuba home

Article published Oct 31, 2005
More Vermont cows may be calling Cuba home

The Cuban government is expected to sign a deal this week to purchase
300 cows from the Northeast, including a sizable number of Vermont cows.

Vermont Secretary of Agriculture Steve Kerr said Saturday that Cuba has
agreed to buy more cows from the state's dairy farmers — the second such
deal in the past year.

Kerr said Cuba is scheduled to sign a contract this week at Cuba's
annual trade fair in Havana. He said the deal to purchase the Vermont
cows is being brokered again by Florida businessman John Parke Wright IV.

"I think it's in the 100-plus range," Kerr said, referring to the number
of Vermont cows.

It was Wright who brokered the first sale of Vermont heifers to Cuba at
last year's trade fair. The 74 Holstein and Jersey heifers arrived in
Cuba in August and are considered of such high quality that Cuba will
use them for breeding.

Kerr said the new contract calls for Alimport, the Cuban agency
responsible for agricultural imports, to purchase Holsteins, Jerseys and
Brown Swiss heifers from Vermont dairy farmers.

He said he expects Cuban agricultural inspectors to visit Vermont early
next year to select the heifers.

Wright, who is licensed by the U.S. government to do business with Cuba,
negotiates a price with each farmer before turning around and selling
the cattle to the Cuban government.

Vermont farmers received an average of $2,100 a head for the cows that
made up the first shipment this summer. But Kerr said he's unsure what
farmers might get paid this time around.

"I don't have a clue," he said. "It's whatever the market will bear."

He hinted, however, that farmers may get less because "milk prices are
starting to soften."

Among the inaugural shipment of Vermont cows to Cuba were two cows from
the Putney School. "Little Debbie," a Jersey heifer that was a gift from
the school to the people of Cuba, recently had her first calf, a bull,
Kerr said.

He said both "Little Debbie" and a Holstein from the Putney School will
be displayed by Wright at the entrance to one of the pavilions at the
Havana Trade Fair that begins this week.

"The two cows are from Vermont and we're very proud and the Putney
School should be very proud," Kerr said.

Vermont's trading relationship with Cuba got its start with a 2004 visit
by Lt. Gov. Brian Dubie. That was followed by a visit by Kerr, who
attended last year's trade fair. Kerr also made a return visit in August
to coincide with the first shipment of heifers from the state.

Sen. James Jeffords, I-Vt., also paid a visit to Cuba this year at which
time the government of Fidel Castro agreed to purchase more food
products from the state.

No state officials are attending this week's trade fair. However,
Gerardo Quaassdorff of the Brattleboro-based Holstein Association USA is
expected to attend, according to Kerr.

In addition to cows, Cuba last year agreed to buy powdered milk and
4,000 bushels of Vermont apples. The apple deal has apparently been held
up over visas that the State Department has yet to issue to Cuban
inspectors.

Kerr said he's hopeful that visas finally will be issued to the Cuban
apple inspectors early next year.

Kerr expressed hope that tensions between Castro's communist regime and
the U.S. might have begun to ease. He said the fact that a team of U.S.
officials will visit Cuba to inspect the recent hurricane damage Cuba is
one positive sign.

"We should have a little sympathy for the Cubans," he said. "I hope this
helps the Bush folks to wake up and work with these people. These people
are our neighbors."

Food, agricultural products and medical supplies are the only items
exempt from the U.S. trade embargo of Cuba. The embargo was put in place
shortly after Castro seized power in 1959 and installed a communist
system of government.

Contact Bruce Edwards at bruce.edwards@rutlandherald.com.

http://www.rutlandherald.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20051031/NEWS/510310391/1002

Rechaza Cuba denuncia de quefinanció a Lula en 2002

Lunes 31 de octubre de 2005

Solecito El PT prepara demanda judicial contra la revista Veja; la
oposición quiere juicio político
Rechaza Cuba denuncia de que financió a Lula en 2002

GERARDO ARREOLA CORRESPONSAL

La Habana, 30 de octubre. El gobierno de Cuba rechazó como "calumnias"
la versión de la revista Veja que atribuye esta semana al gobierno de La
Habana haber ayudado a financiar en 2002 la campaña electoral del
Partido de los Trabajadores (PT), que postulaba al ahora presidente Luiz
Inacio Lula da Silva.

Cuba "jamás ha interferido en los asuntos internos de esta hermana
nación, y responsabiliza totalmente de esta maniobra propagandística a
los agresivos planes del imperialismo contra Cuba y contra Lula", dijo
una declaración del embajador cubano en Brasilia, Pedro Núñez Mosquera,
que fue entregada aquí por la cancillería a la prensa extranjera.

Al rechazar "las mentiras publicadas por la revista Veja", Cuba
"confirma su respeto y amistad hacia el pueblo brasileño y hacia el
gobierno que encabeza el presidente Lula", señaló el comunicado.

"Quienes orquestan esta campaña de mentiras contra Cuba y contra el
gobierno brasileño buscan afectar las relaciones bilaterales entre
nuestros dos países, caracterizadas por el diálogo fraternal, el respeto
mutuo y la no injerencia en los asuntos internos de nuestras naciones",
agregó.

La versión fue refutada el sábado por el presidente del PT, Ricardo
Berzoini, quien anunció una demanda judicial contra Veja.

La ley brasileña prohíbe a los partidos políticos recibir fondos del
exterior.

El semanario dijo en su número de esta semana que la campaña
presidencial de Lula recibió en 2002 unos 3 millones de dólares de Cuba
y atribuyó la información a ex colaboradores del actual ministro de
Economía, Antonio Palocci.

La declaración oficial cubana conjeturó que la versión intenta
"obstaculizar" planes de cooperación entre los dos gobiernos y "desviar
la atención de la cada vez más compleja realidad que enfrenta" en sus
agendads interna y externa el presidente estadunidense, George W. Bush,
quien tiene prevista una próxima visita a Brasil.

Por lo pronto, la oposición brasileña puso en su mira la supuesta
denuncia de presunto apoyo financiero de Cuba a la campaña de Lula, y
algunos sectores evalúan la creación de una comisión legislativa para
investigarlo, reportó Afp desde Brasilia.

"Es un hecho gravísimo. Si es comprobado, Lula tiene que entregar el
cargo. El presidente no tendrá condiciones de gobernar", declaró el
senador Tasso Jereissati, próximo presidente del opositor Partido de la
Social Democracia Brasileña (PSDB), en declaraciones al diario O Estado
de Sao Paulo. El legislador defendió el inicio en el Congreso de un
proceso de impeachment (juicio político) contra Lula.

José Serra, potencial rival de Lula en las elecciones de 2006, alcalde
de Sao Paulo y presidente del PSDB, opinó que la acusación "parece
verosímil", mientras el líder del opositor Partido del Frente Liberal
(derecha), Jorge Bornhausen, expresó que "la denuncia es gravísima y
debe ser investigada en profundidad".

Así, Lula parece haber recurrido a la ayuda divina, rodeando su
escritorio de imágenes de santos, informó O Estado. A comienzos de
semana Lula sumó a la decoración de su despacho cinco imágenes
religiosas en un aparador detrás de su escritorio.

En un contexto político cada vez más complicado, atacado por la
oposición, criticado por la prensa y con su popularidad afectada, el
mandatario parece haber apelado a la "compañía divina" para realizar sus
tareas en el tercer piso del Palacio del Planalto en Brasilia, concluyó
Afp.

http://www.jornada.unam.mx/2005/10/31/042n2mun.php

Crearan Venezuela y Cuba una compania naviera

Crearán Venezuela y Cuba una compañía naviera

por Info-transportes Online en 31/10/2005 12:09 hrs

CARACAS, 31 de Octubre.- Los gobiernos de Venezuela y Cuba firmaron un
acuerdo marítimo con el fin de desarrollar una empresa naviera
binacional, encargada de transportar los envíos de hidrocarburos
realizados en el marco de Petrocaribe.

En un comunicado, se informó que el convenio fue suscrito por el asesor
del Ministerio de Transporte de Cuba, Alvaro Montero, y el director de
Petróleos de Venezuela y presidente de su filial PDV Marina, Asdrúbal
Chávez.

Este acuerdo permitirá llevar mayores beneficios a los pueblos de los
países caribeños, comentó Chávez, quien consideró que el convenio "es la
continuación del proceso de integración energética".

Montero, por su parte, agradeció a Venezuela y a su presidente, Hugo
Chávez, por impulsar Petrocaribe, proyecto que beneficiará a los países
de esa región.

El nuevo acuerdo establece los lineamientos básicos del convenio que
próximamente suscribirán Venezuela y Cuba para proveer de transporte
eficiente, seguro y económico a los países participantes en Petrocaribe.

Ese pacto fue firmado por los líderes de la región en una cumbre
celebrada en la ciudad venezolana de Puerto La Cruz, en junio último.

Petrocaribe elimina los intermediarios y los fletes se cobran al costo,
lo cual significa importantes ahorros de recursos, que se destinarán a
programas sociales y económicos.

Los fondos provendrían también de la suma equivalente al porcentaje del
pago aplazado de la factura petrolera, que entregará Venezuela a las
naciones caribeñas.(Inf. PL)

http://info-transportes.com/nota.php?id=2101

La verdad de Alpha 66

POLITICA
La verdad de Alpha 66

Tania Díaz Castro

LA HABANA, Cuba - Octubre (www.cubanet.org) - Siempre nos hemos
preguntado los cubanos por qué el régimen de Fidel Castro llama
terrorista a la organización Alpha 66, si esta organización ha empleado
los mismos métodos de lucha de quienes se enfrentaron a la dictadura de
Fulgencio Batista.

Con 43 años de fundada y con sede en Miami, Alpha 66 ha asumido la
autoría de las operaciones militares que ha realizado en territorio
cubano a partir de 1962, año que fue fundada.

El 31 de diciembre de 1964 el ex comandante Eloy Gutiérrez Menoyo, jefe
de operaciones de Alpha 66, desembarcó en Baracoa con el objetivo de
abrir un frente guerrillero, tal y como hizo Fidel Castro años antes.
Cerca del río Moa y junto a otros tres combatientes, Menoyo fue
capturado, y luego condenado a 50 años de cárcel, de los que cumplió 22.
Hoy, Menoyo vive en La Habana -desde 2003- en espera de un espacio legal
para su organización pacifista Cambio Cubano.

Es curioso el hecho de que casi todos los fundadores de Alpha 66,
incluyendo a su jefe principal, el ex comandante Andrés Nazario Sargén,
fallecido hace algunos meses, hayan participado en la lucha guerrillera
contra Batista en el II Frente Nacional del Escambray. Fue allí donde
aprendieron las tácticas de la guerra de guerrillas, como emboscadas a
patrullas, la utilización de francotiradores, trampas explosivas, golpes
inesperados, ataques a instalaciones y depósitos enemigos, ya que
carecían de fuerza numérica y del armamento idóneo para enfrentarse a un
ejército.

La práctica de este tipo de guerra violenta es muy antigua. La Biblia
relata cómo de esta forma los israelitas conquistaron Canaán bajo el
mando de Josué. Simón Bolívar, Miguel Hidalgo, Ho Chi Minh, Fidel Castro
y Ernesto Che Guevara son ejemplos de líderes guerrilleros.

El poeta y ex prisionero político plantado Ernesto Díaz Rodríguez es el
nuevo líder de Alpha 66. Fue hecho prisionero en una zona rural de Pinar
del Río el 4 de diciembre de 1968, luego de haber desembarcado junto a
un grupo de guerrilleros. Fue capturado y de los 45 años de condena
impuesta cumplió 22.

Díaz Rodríguez desmiente al régimen de Fidel Castro, y afirma que la
organización que representa jamás ha realizado actos terroristas que
pudieran propagar el pánico en la población. Expresa que "ojalá y la
solución para Cuba se produzca por medios pacíficos", pero asegura que
Alpha 66 es una organización de combate, de estrategia, tal y como lo
propusieron José Martí, Máximo Gómez y Antonio Maceo en las luchas
independentistas.

Aclara además que Alpha 66 es un proyecto que "defiende el derecho de
los cubanos a luchar por la libertad de Cuba". Para ello cuenta con el
campamento Rumbo Sur, de entrenamiento militar, donde practican tiro,
kárate, judo, actividades legales en Estados Unidos.

Vicente Méndez, ex comandante de la lucha contra Batista, es uno de los
mártires más respetados de Alpha 66. llegó al frente de una expedición a
las costas cubanas el 17 de enero de 1970 y cayó en combate. Otros
mártires de esta organización murieron fusilados. Verdaderos héroes
contra el totalitarismo castrista, que los llama terroristas. Una
mentira repetida durante años que no se ha convertido en verdad.

http://www.cubanet.org/CNews/y05/oct05/31a9.htm

Introduccion a la democracia autoritaria

La semana política I

Introducción a la democracia autoritaria

Dos tipos de regímenes políticos predominan en el mundo actual. Uno, en
retroceso, es la autocracia. El otro, en expansión, es la democracia
republicana. En el primero, cuya denominación proviene del griego autós,
"él mismo", el gobierno es "él mismo" el poder. Autocracias son, por
ejemplo, China y Cuba. Capitalista y en dirección de una prosperidad que
quizá le traiga la democracia la primera; comunista y estancada en la
pobreza, la segunda.

Llamamos "democracias republicanas", en cambio, a aquellos regímenes
donde el gobierno no se identifica con el poder por dos razones.
Primero, porque ejerce la parte del poder que le toca por elección libre
del pueblo. Este es el ingrediente democrático de las democracias
republicanas. Segundo, porque el gobierno tampoco ejerce "todo" el
poder, ya que lo comparte con otros dos órganos también llamados
"poderes": el "poder legislativo", de origen igualmente popular, que
reduce al gobierno a ser sólo el "poder ejecutivo", en tanto que el
poder judicial, de origen no popular, los controla a ambos.

La división de los poderes que se limitan unos a otros es el ingrediente
republicano de las democracias republicanas. Si existen poderes locales
autónomos, la democracia republicana deja de ser unitaria, como Gran
Bretaña o Chile, y pasa a ser federal, como Suiza o los Estados Unidos.

Las democracias republicanas predominan en todo el mundo desarrollado y
en parte del mundo subdesarrollado. Las democracias republicanas
desarrolladas son, sin excepción, prósperas, mientras que las
democracias republicanas subdesarrolladas pugnan por salir de la pobreza.

El cuadro que hemos presentado hasta ahora es de manual y puede
encontrarse en cualquier libro de instrucción cívica. El problema
empieza cuando nos preguntamos hasta dónde encaja en él la Argentina
contemporánea.

Después del domingo

Diríamos que la Argentina actual es más bien democrática, porque el
pueblo elige periódicamente a sus autoridades ejecutivas y legislativas.
Pero es sólo "más bien" democrática porque la expresión electoral del
pueblo sufre en ella limitaciones significativas. Desde el momento en
que nuestro Poder Ejecutivo domina al resto de los poderes, tampoco
diríamos que la Argentina actual es republicana, sino más bien
autoritaria. Como se vio claramente en las elecciones del último
domingo, la Argentina no es una autocracia ni una democracia
republicana. Es un régimen híbrido al que podríamos denominar democracia
autoritaria.

Para que la Argentina no fuera "más bien" democrática sino simplemente
"democrática", la votación popular debería exhibir un alto grado de
transparencia. Al obligar a los ciudadanos a votar no ya por candidatos
conocidos que respondan ante ellos, sino por "listas sábana" en las que
cada jefe partidario instala a sus seguidores incondicionales, y al
haber anulado en los hechos las elecciones primarias, abiertas y
simultáneas que la ley postula pero no exige, nuestros jefes partidarios
son los verdaderos electores de las listas sábana. Sólo en las
elecciones presidenciales cada candidato es conocido y se vota por él o
contra él, mientras que en las elecciones legislativas, como las que
tuvimos el último domingo, los ciudadanos se ven reducidos a escoger
entre diversas "sábanas" confeccionadas por los jefes partidarios.

A esto habría que agregar que los partidos que no cuentan con miles de
fiscales se ven expuestos a recuentos mentirosos en las mesas de votación.

El carácter limitado de nuestra democracia se ve acentuado por el hecho
de que, siendo una parte de los ciudadanos, que se estima en un tercio
del total, económicamente dependientes de la buena voluntad del
gobernante de turno a través de los planes de ayuda social y de la
diseminación de puestos públicos que responden al favoritismo y no a la
necesidad o la idoneidad, podríamos incorporar a todos esos ciudadanos
en la atribulada legión de los "votantes cautivos".

Cuando se analizan los resultados electorales del último domingo, no se
pueden ignorar ni las listas sábana ni el voto cautivo ni los recuentos
sospechosos de mesa al evaluar el alcance democrático de nuestra
democracia. A esta baja calidad de nuestro sistema electoral podría
deberse el hecho inquietante de que el "voto positivo" de los
ciudadanos, es decir, el voto efectivo por tal o cual candidato, haya
venido disminuyendo en forma constante desde 1983. En los años ochenta,
tuvimos más del ochenta por ciento de votos positivos. En los años
noventa, este porcentaje bajó a algo más del setenta por ciento. En las
tres elecciones que hemos tenido hasta ahora en los años dos mil, el
porcentaje del voto positivo descendió al sesenta por ciento.

El último domingo, cuatro de cada diez argentinos se negaron a votar
positivamente, ya fuera por ausencia, por votos nulos o en blanco. Ello
no debería asombrarnos ante el bajo rendimiento social de nuestros
gobiernos democráticos puesto que, en tanto que en 1983 había un 16 por
ciento de pobres, éstos rozan ahora el 40 por ciento.

La anemia republicana

En cuanto al ingrediente "republicano" de nuestra democracia, hay que
atender al dominio del Poder Ejecutivo sobre los demás poderes o
hiperpresidencialismo. De 2003 a esta parte, el Presidente no ha
gobernado habitualmente mediante la aprobación de leyes sancionadas por
el Congreso, sino a través de decretos "de necesidad y urgencia" cuando
ya cesó la urgencia de la crisis de 2002 y cuando tampoco había
necesidad, porque el Presidente contó, en el Congreso, con el respaldo
invariable de una "mayoría automática". Recuérdese en fin que el
Presidente pudo, con la ayuda de esa mayoría automática, nombrar a
discreción a casi todos los jueces de la Corte Suprema.

¿Fueron los gobernadores, acaso, un dique de contención al Poder
Ejecutivo nacional? No lo fueron porque nuestro defectuoso sistema
tributario otorga al Presidente el manejo discrecional de la famosa
"caja" de los recursos fiscales, lo que ha obligado a los gobiernos
provinciales, sea cual fuere su tendencia política, a doblegarse
mansamente ante el Presidente bajo pena de quedarse sin el
financiamiento de sus propios gastos. El manejo de la "caja" fiscal
también estuvo en manos de otros presidentes, como Menem y Duhalde, pero
el superávit fiscal que tenemos ahora lo ha potenciado.

Teóricamente, la República Argentina es "federal". En los hechos es
unitaria. Hay numerosos países que se confiesan unitarios sin anular por
ello su carácter republicano. Lo notable entre nosotros es que somos
federales de nombre, pero unitarios de ejercicio.

Estamos lejos ya, afortunadamente, de las autocracias militares. También
estamos lejos todavía, lamentablemente, de las democracias republicanas.
Somos lo que las elecciones del domingo no hicieron otra cosa que
corroborar: una democracia autoritaria, esto es, una democracia
republicana penetrada por el virus autoritario. La meta de los
argentinos, por consiguiente, es clara: ir convirtiéndonos, con
paciencia y esfuerzo, en una democracia republicana auténtica,
decididamente encaminada a partir de su alta calidad institucional hacia
el desarrollo económico y social que nos sigue convocando desde el
horizonte.

Por Mariano Grondona

http://www.lanacion.com.ar/opinion/Nota.asp?nota_id=751958

Coordinating Cuba's Support for Marxist-Leninist Violence in the Americas


CASTRO'S AMERICA DEPARTMENT

Coordinating Cuba's Support for Marxist-Leninist Violence in the Americas

By Rex A. Hudson
The Cuban American National Foundation
1988
Latino Studies Program
Indiana University
Infosearch:
José F. Sánchez
Bureau Chief
USA
Research Dept.
La Nueva Cuba
Octubtre 30, 2005

TABLE OF CONTENTS

List of Abbreviations
Introduction
I. Castro's Covert War
II. The Guevarist Years
III. Soviet-Cuban Rapprochement
IV The PCC/CC's "Guerrilla International"
V. The Nicaraguan Revolutionary Model
VI. Castro's Nicaraguan "Robot"
VII. Exporting the Nicaraguan Model
Central America
The Caribbean
South America
The United States
VIII. DA/DGRE Foreign Policy Influence
IX. The Soviet-Cuban Diplomatic Gambit
X. Conclusion and Outlook
Appendix 1: Cited DA Officials
Appendix 2: Biographical Profile: Manuel Piñeiro Losada
Book References

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AVC Alfaro Lives [Ecuador]
CCGI International Guerrilla Coordinating Committee
CEA Center for North American Studies [DA, Cuba]
CEAL Center for Latin American Studies [DA, Cuba]
CP Communist Party
CPSU Communist Party of the Soviet Union
CRN National Revolutionary Command [Puerto Rico]
DA America Department [Cuba]
DGI General Directorate of Intelligence [Cuba]
DGRE General Directorate of Foreign Relations [Cuba]
DGSE General Directorate of State Security [Nicaragua]
DL Liberation Directorate [Cuba]
DLN National Liberation Directorate [Cuba]
DNU-MRH National Unity Directorate of the Revolutionary Movement of Honduras
DOE Special Operations Directorate [Cuba]
DRI International Relations Department [Nicaragua]
DRU Unified Revolutionary Directorate [El Salvador]
DSE State Security Department [Cuba]
ELN National Liberation Army [Bolivia]
ELN National Liberation Army [Colombia]
EPL Popular Liberation Army [Colombia]
EPS Sandinistas People's Army [Nicaragua]
ERP People's Revolutionary Army [Argentina]
ERP People's Revolutionary Army [El Salvador]
FALN Armed Forces of National Liberation [Puerto Rico]
FALN Armed Forces of National Liberation [Venezuela]
FARC Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia
FARN Armed Forces of National Resistance [El Salvador]
FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation [United States]
FHLP Honduran Front for Popular Liberation
FMLN Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front [El Salvador]
FPMR Manuel Rodríguez Popular Front [Chile]
FPR-LZ Lorenzo Zelaya Popular Revolutionary Front [Honduras]
FSLN Sandinista National Liberation Front [Nicaragua]
GCR General Revolutionary Command [Guatemala]
ICAP Institute for Friendship With the Peoples [Cuba]
JCR Revolutionary Coordinating Junta
GCR General Revolutionary Command [Guatemala]
ICAP Institute for Friendship With the Peoples [Cuba]
JCR Revolutionary Coordinating Junta
KGB Committee for State Security [Soviet Union]
M-19 19th of April Movement [Colombia]
M-26 26th of July Movement
MININT Interior Ministry [Cuba]
MINREX Ministry of Foreign Relations [Cuba]
MINT Ministry of Interior [Nicaragua]
MIR Movement of the Revolutionary Left [Chile]
MLN National Liberation Movement of Tupamaros [Uruguay]
MRN New Republic Movement [Costa Rica]
MRTA Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement [Peru]
NJM New Jewel Movement [Grenada]
OAS Organization of American States
OLAS Latin American Solidarity Organization [Cuba]
OVRP Organization of Volunteers for the Puerto Rican Revolution
PCC/CC Communist Party of Cuba / Central Committee
PCCh Communist Party of Chile
PCES Communist Party of El Salvador
PDF Panama Defense Forces
PFLP Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine
PLO Palestine Liberation Organization
PSP Puerto Rican Socialist Party
PVP Popular Vanguard Party [Costa Rica]
RVP People's Revolutionary Party [Suriname]
SI Socialist International
SL Shining Path [Peru]
UN United Nations
URNG Guatemalan National Revolutionary Union
WPJ Workers Party of Jamaica

"When I saw rockets firing... I swore to myself that the Americans were
going to pay dearly for what they were doing. When this war is over, a
much wider and bigger war will begin for me: the war that I'm going to
launch against them. I am aware that this is my true destiny..."

-Fidel Castro in a letter to his aide and confidante Celia Sánchez in
1958. (1)

Introduction

In 1985, Latin America surpassed Western Europe as the region with the
most acts of international terrorism against U.S. targets, and remained
a prime venue of domestic and international terrorist incidents in 1986
and 1987. Largely responsible for the steadily increasing levels of
anti-American and anti-state violence in Latin America during the 1980s
are at least two dozen Marxist-Leninist organizations known to receive
support and advice from Cuba.

Pro-Cuban groups currently pose serious national security threats to two
Latin American countries in particular. El Salvador and Colombia. In
Colombia, many significant acts of anti-U.S. and anti-state terrorism
also have been sponsored by the cocaine trafficking mafia known as the
Medellín Cartel, which has hired the services of the Colombian guerrilla
groups. Policymakers should be particularly concerned about these dual
threats to democratic governments in Latin America, as well as
Cuban/Soviet-supported efforts to establish Marxist regimes in Panama
and Chile.

It is doubtful that the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN)
could have seized power in Nicaragua in 1979 without Cuba's extensive
material, advisory and other support. The Sandinista victory vindicated
the Cuban-Soviet "political-military" model of revolution which
conditions Cuban-Soviet support for so-called "national liberation
movements" on their progress in unifying in an alliance with the local
pro-Soviet Communist party, through which Cuban guidance could then be
provided. Since 1979, the Sandinista regime in Nicaragua has actively
assisted Cuban efforts to support the extreme left in the region, and,
therefore, policy-makers must also be equally concerned about
Nicaragua's subversive activities.

This paper will examine how and to what extent Cuba and Nicaragua have
been supporting guerrilla warfare and terrorism by Marxist-Leninist
organizations in the hemisphere since 1979. It will focus on the
guerrilla and terrorist coordinating and support activities of the Cuban
Communist Party Central Committee's (PCC/CC) America Department (DA), as
well as the DA's counterpart organization in Nicaragua, the
International Relations Directorate (DRI). These agencies -supported by
a network of other organizations in their respective intelligence and
security services- are responsible for conducting their governments'
subversive programs in the hemisphere. Various Cuban and Nicaraguan
intelligence defectors have emphasized, moreover, that Cuba controls the
Nicaraguan intelligence and security apparatus and uses it as a front to
obscure Havana's own covert activities in the region.

Some of the Castroite groups discussed in this paper -such as those in
Argentina, Chile, Peru, and Honduras- are primarily urban terrorist
organizations, without any significant guerrilla forces engaging in
rural insurgency. These groups have not advanced sufficiently in their
organizational development to wage a viable guerrilla insurgency. Others
-such as those in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Colombia- may be
categorized as primarily guerrilla organizations that engage in
skirmishes with military and security forces and exercise de facto
control over some territory in remote areas. Most of the Cuban-supported
guerrilla groups, however, also systematically perpetrated terrorism,
such as kidnap/ransom operations, in their formative years and continue
using it selectively.

Castroite groups usually carry out actions consonant with Havana's
strategic objectives and guidance, and the dictates of Marxism-Leninism,
i.e., targeting representatives of Western democratic governments
(especially the United States) and rightist dictatorships (namely
Chile), and in solidarity with other Marxist-Leninist or pro-Soviet
revolutionary groups or regimes (such as Libya) in other regions. The
solidarity factor helps to explain why several Sandinista terrorists
assisted the infamous hijacker Leila Khaled of the Popular Front for the
Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) in an unsuccessful attempt to hijack an
Israeli airliner in London in 1970, and why Colombian 19th of April
(M-19) terrorists participated in the kidnapping of an Ecuadorean banker
by an Ecuadorean terrorist group in 1985. This ideological solidarity is
currently being demonstrated in Colombia and Panama, where Cubans,
Nicaraguans, and members of foreign terrorist organizations are
reportedly organizing international brigades to engage in guerrilla
warfare or terrorism.

I. CASTRO'S COVERT WAR

A growing body of information provided by credible sources, including
high-level Cuban and Nicaraguan intelligence defectors, contradicts
compellingly the myth that after Ernesto "Che" Guevara's defeat in
Bolivia in 1967 Castro gave up "exporting revolution" to pursue a more
"mature" policy of developing good state-to-state relations in Latin
America. (2) For example, Pamela S. Falk noted in her well-documented
textbook, Cuban Foreign Policy, that Castro has never abandoned "the
policy of promoting revolution both by the expansion of diplomatic
relations and armed struggle," a policy which "continued as a principal
program in Cuban foreign policy from the early days of the
revolution."(3) Jiri and Virginia Valenta have amply documented how
Cuba, backed by the Soviet Union, "has played a pivotal role" in
exacerbating local and regional problems "by assisting the revolutionary
guerrilla movements."(4)

Although the basic causes of revolution clearly cannot be exported, Cuba
-aided by Nicaragua since July 1979- has provided the catalysts needed
to foment and support "armed struggle" in vulnerable countries of Latin
America, e.g., through the provision of arms, munitions, and safe
heaven, as well as guerrilla and terrorist training and logistical,
financial, propaganda, advisory and other support. Under Cuban guidance,
these Castroite groups have pursued a systematic, graduated strategy for
waging revolutionary terrorism against the U.S. presence and local
government and military officials.

As noted above, the trends in Latin America in recent years indicate
growing levels of anti-U.S. Castroite and Maoist terrorism and acts of
guerrilla sabotage, such as oil pipeline bombings against America
petroleum companies in Colombia. According to the U.S. State Department,
Latin America accounted for about fifty-five percent of all incidents of
terrorism involving U.S. targets in 1986. With 159 international
terrorist attacks, or one-third more than in 1985, Latin America
replaced Western Europe that year as the second most active arena for
international terrorism. Most of the 1986 incidents took place in
Colombia, Peru, and Chile. (5) In 1987, Latin America continued to be by
far the leading region of anti-U.S. terrorist incidents.

Castro has indeed fulfilled the pledge he made in a July 26, 1960,
speech to convert the Andes into the Sierra Maestra of all America.
Today, Castroite groups pose significant guerrilla or terrorist threats
in the larger Pacific Coast Andean countries -Chile, Peru and Colombia-
as well as Central America. The PCC/CC's DA has worked quietly and
effectively to train, build up, and unify at least twenty-seven active
guerrilla organizations that are operating in many countries of the
region and -in late 1987- totaled about 25,000 armed and trained
members. (6) According to the U.S. Southern Command (Southcom), all of
these groups -with the main exception of the Maoist Shining Path (SL) in
Peru-are Marxist-Leninist and known to be supported by Cuba. (7)
Southcom and U.S. State Department analysts have estimated that a
minimum of 20,000 individuals from around the world, including more than
10,000 Latin Americans, have attended at least one of the more than
fifty guerrilla or terrorist training courses offered in Cuban military
facilities since Castro seized power in 1959. (8) Between the mid-1970s
and mid-1980s, an additional 20,000 individuals from several African
countries and Nicaragua had undergone indoctrination at Cuba's Isle of
Youth "educational complex."(9)

After two decades of trial and error, Castro, with the aid of the DA,
finally found the right formula for revolution in Nicaragua in 1979.
Convinced that the "Nicaraguan model" could be replicated elsewhere, the
DA has been working relentlessly ever since to coordinate and
systematize similar efforts throughout Latin America. The DA has
selectively provided material, training, and advisory support for "armed
struggle" from San Juan and San Salvador to Santiago. By using Cuba's
diplomatic missions and other fronts, including Nicaragua itself, the DA
has expertly cloaked its own key role, allowing Castro to simultaneously
improve Cuba's diplomatic standing in the region. Cuba's so-called
"mature" image has, in turn, permitted the Soviet Union to make
significant diplomatic gains in Latin America.

This report will trace the evolution of the DA, as well as the expansion
of its role and influence in helping to develop and implement the
Cuban-Soviet "political-military" revolutionary strategy in the
hemisphere, at least insofar as these activities have been reported by
journalists, scholars, a 1981 U.S. Department of State report, and Cuban
and Nicaraguan intelligence defectors. The history of the DA cannot, of
course, he separated from the covert career of its only chief, Manuel
Piñeiro Losada (Barba Roja, or "Red Beard"), whose publicly reported
activities also are documented herein (see Appendix 2 for biography).

II. THE GUEVARIST YEARS

Fidel Castro did not wait until taking power to launch his terrorist war
against the U.S. presence in Latin America. After Castro's Department of
Rebel Intelligence learned in late May 1958 that two of dictator
Fulgencio Batista's airplanes had been loaded with U.S. arms and
ammunition in the U.S. Naval Base at Guantánamo, the Castro brothers
began planning a major terrorist operation against Americans in Cuba.
That summer, 26th of July Movement (M-26) terrorists under Raúl Castro's
command kidnapped fifty-seven North Americans, including a busload of
twenty-seven U.S. sailors and Marines, and two Canadians. (10) The
ensuing international hostage crisis threatened to result in U.S.
military action against the M-26, an event that could have thwarted
Castro's seizure of power. Although the United States refused to meet
Raúl Castro's ransom demands, which included ceasing all U.S. military
support of the Batista regime, the Castro brothers gained worldwide
publicity in releasing the hostages.

In 1959-60, within months after taking power, Castro and his chief of
clandestine operations, Major "Ché" Guevara, undertook to export the
Cuban revolutionary model by launching armed expeditions against Panama,
Haiti, the Dominican Republic, and Nicaragua, but these exuberant
attempts ended in total failure. In the case of Nicaragua, Eloy
Gutiérrez Menoyo, a Cuban revolutionary hero who spent twenty-two years
in Castro's prisons, revealed that he met clandestinely in Nicaragua
with nascent forces building against General Anastasio Somoza Debayle in
1959. According to Gutiérrez, Castro and other senior leaders actually
rejected helping the Nicaraguans who composed the anti-Somoza resistance
because they were mostly centrists (11). Instead, in 1961, the Cubans
formed a Marxist-Leninist, anti-Somoza guerrilla organization that
became known as the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN).
According to the brother of the late Carlos Fonseca Amador (the FSLN's
Stalinist Nicaraguan founder), the Cuban ambassador in Nicaragua,
Quintín Piño Machado, formed the FSLN; the Cubans then built it up and
chose its leadership (12).

Castro and Guevara also decided on a more systematic approach to
exporting revolution by organizing guerrilla training programs in Cuba
and, in late 1961, establishing the General Directorate of Intelligence
(DGI) under the Ministry of the Interior (MININT). Castro named his
MININT vice and technical minister, Major Manuel Piñeiro Losada, to the
post of DGI chief. To provide a guerrilla support mechanism, Piñeiro and
Guevara formed, under the DGI, three Liberation Committees -organized
regionally for the Caribbean, Central America, and South America- that
became known as the Liberation Directorate (DL) (see Figure 1). (13) In
the early 1960's, the DL also was responsible for supporting "liberation
movements" in Africa. It trained and funded African revolutionaries,
including those who overthrew the government of Zanzibar in 1963. (14)
Whereas Guevara's revolutionary interests focused on Africa in the early
1960s, Piñeiro was more oriented toward the Western Hemisphere.

Evidence that DGI chief Piñeiro was directing guerrilla groups in Latin
America in the early 1960s surfaced when the Colombian Army found a
letter written by him to a group of Colombian rebels, whom he told to
carry out Cuban instructions exactly as stated or else their monthly
payment would be reduced or suspended. (15) On January 31, 1962, the
Organization of American States (OAS) expelled Cuba for supporting
Venezuelan guerrillas. Four days later, on February 4, a far from
contrite Castro proclaimed his Second Declaration of Havana, in which he
called on "the people" of the continent to "follow Cuba's example" by
initiating guerrilla warfare. (16)

In an exchange of letters with Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev during
the Cuban missile crisis of October 1962, President John F. Kennedy
pledged that the United States would not invade Cuba if the Soviets
withdrew all offensive strategic weapons and if Cuba agreed not to
extend "it's aggressive or subversive activities to any part of the
hemisphere." Following the crisis, however, the Castro regime embarked
on a policy of full support for armed revolution in Latin America. In a
televised January 16, 1963, speech, Castro virtually declared war
against the hemisphere, telling viewers that their duty was to lead the
continent in Cuba-style revolution.

As a result of the OAS sanctions imposed on Cuba in July 1964 for its
continued support of Venezuelan guerrillas, Cuban dependence on the
Soviets increased. A compromise agreement that was worked out between
Castro and the Latin American communist parties (Cps) that November
lasted only until the U.S. intervention in the Dominican Republic in
April 1965. The CPs, with Soviet approval, revoked their agreements to
support guerrilla warfare in six countries and retreated to a less
provocative "united front" strategy. Castro, however, decided to
globalize Cuba's revolutionary role.

By hosting a series of international conferences of extremists in Havana
during 1966-68, Castro succeeded in creating a nascent world terrorist
fraternity and in strengthening his leadership role in it, especially in
the Latin American movement. At the Tricontinental Conference, held in
January 1966 and attended by 513 predominantly Castroite leaders of
eighty-three Third World radical movements and CPs, Castro promised the
delegates that "any revolutionary movement anywhere in the world can
count on Cuba's unconditional support." (17) Nevertheless, Cuban support
was no longer entirely unconditional. As Maurice Halperin points out, it
was now contingent on recognition of: (1) Cuba's present and future
military role in Latin American guerrilla operations, and (2) undisputed
Cuban political leadership and direction of Latin American revolutionary
movements. (18)

Castro clearly upstaged the Soviets at the Tricontinental Conference,
but he partly appeased them by using the occasion to break with China
and denounce and exclude the Trotskyites. He also ensured that the
series of "armed struggle" resolutions that were adopted by the
conference targeted mainly Colombia, Guatemala, Peru and Venezuela
-countries without major diplomatic or trade importance for the Soviets
(who declined, however, to endorse "armed struggle" in Peru). (19) By
the end of 1966, Cuba had established more than a dozen international
guerrilla training camps under the supervision of Soviet KGB Colonels
Vadim Kochergin and Victor Simonov. (20) One of Colonel Simonov's first
graduates was Ilich Ramírez Sánchez (a.k.a. "Carlos the Jackal"). (21)

The Soviets and Cubans remained far apart on revolutionary strategy,
however. The Soviets called for unifying revolutionary forces in a broad
popular front, but Castro endorsed Guevara's grandiose scheme of
creating "two, three, or many Vietnams" in the Western Hemisphere.
Guevara dropped out of sight in March 1965 and fought covertly, along
with about 300 Cubans, in Zaire (then called the Belgian Congo) for the
next 12 months or so. (22)

After Guevara returned secretly to Cuba, Castro accepted his rationale
for targeting Bolivia to be the foco (insurrectional center) of
"continental revolution." Guevara thereupon infiltrated into Bolivia to
organize a guerrilla campaign. DGI official Luís Fernández de Oña
coordinated the Bolivian operation from DGI headquarters in Havana. (23)
According to DGI defector Orlando Castro Hidalgo, Cuba actually "planned
a two-pronged attack on South America," with the first prong emanating
from Bolivia and the second from Venezuela. (24)

Soviet-Cuban relations deteriorated further as a result of the
uncompromising "armed struggle"-line adopted at the meeting of the Latin
American Solidarity Organization in Havana in the summer in 1967 and
Castro's continued self-promotion. Nevertheless, adopted at the meeting
was the important organizational principle of a "unified
politico-military command." This action marked the beginning of a
gradual shift in Castro's policy away from ineffectual Guevarism toward
closer alignment with the more orthodox Marxist-Leninist strategy. The
latter made Cuban support contingent not only on the existence of
revolutionary conditions in a given country, but also on unification of
the local guerrilla groups and Moscow-line CP. Guevara's death in combat
in Bolivia in October 1967 effectively ended the era of foco theory,
which was predicated on the unrealistic assumption that prior
revolutionary conditions are not needed in order to foment a guerrilla
insurgency.

III. SOVIET-CUBAN RAPPROCHEMENT

Soviet economic pressure on Cuba in 1967-68, including an oil embargo,
forced Castro to finally capitulate to Soviet demands. These included
adoption of a pro-Soviet/pro-CP line; cooperation in a two-pronged
Soviet strategy of improving trade and diplomatic relations in Latin
America while developing a more sophisticated and selective
revolutionary strategy; and subordination of the DCI to the KGB. (25)

After taking control of the DGI, the KGB compelled Castro to replace its
chief, Manuel Piñeiro, with José Méndez Cominches in 1969. (26) One
theory posited that the Soviets had not forgiven Piñeiro, a Castro
loyalist, for thwarting a KGB plot -in collusion with a pro-Soviet
"microfaction" of the PCC/CC- to oust Castro in early 1968 and replace
him with a party member more amenable to Moscow's orders. (27)
Nevertheless, Castro kept Piñeiro in his other position as MININT vice
minister, and also gave him supervisory control over the 400-member DL
staff.

Gerardo Peraza, a former DGI official who defected in 1971, affirmed
that the Soviets had "allowed Castro to take Manuel Piñeiro away and
name him head of the Department of Liberation, and the intelligence
service remained under the orders of Colonel Simonov." (28) Peraza added
that the Soviets tried to "bolster Fidel Castro's ego" by giving him
"the power or the freedom to work against the Latin American countries,
such as Nicaragua, El Salvador." (29) Castro Hidalgo described the terms
of the agreement as follows:

Castro will faithfully follow Soviet policy when basic Soviet interests
are involved. Where basic Soviet diplomatic and commercial interests are
not involved, the Cuban government will be permitted to undertake
revolutionary adventures. (30)

The organization that Castro created in 1969 to oversee these adventures
was the National Liberation Directorate (DLN), which was soon made
independent of the MININT. (31) Thus, the DL became the DLN, with
Piñeiro as its chief. Meanwhile, according to Peraza, the DGI
reorganized, "adopting the same structure of the intelligence service in
the Soviet Union," in order to provide the Soviets with the intelligence
of the United States that they now required of the DGI. (32) This
included creating separate departments for Economic and Military
Intelligence against the United States, Political Information, and
Foreign Counterintelligence. (33) Whereas the activities of the DGI and
DL/DLN previously had overlapped considerably, these agencias now
operated under a greater division of labor.

For example, Peraza explained that until the DGI's reorganization in
1970, both the DGI and DL had operated jointly against Puerto Rico.
Henceforth, the DGI would focus its efforts on collecting military,
political and economic information about the United States (i.e.,
espionage) and would no longer be involved in supporting Puerto Rican
terrorists; the DLN would assume that duty. (34) Peraza also noted that,
subsequent to 1970, the DGI could "count on any means" of Soviet
support, whereas "the Department of Liberation of Latin America and
Africa has a limited amount of money and a limited quantity of weapons
and other means." (35) In other words, the Soviets allowed Castro to
Piñeiro, but the agency that he headed lacked bureaucratic status.

The DLN's emergence coincided with a significant change in Cuban
revolutionary strategy and tactics. As Castro Hidalgo explained, the
Cubans decided not to send anymore Cuban military leaders to assist
guerrilla groups until a significant level of revolutionary development
was reached and the Cubans were invited in by the guerrilla leaders.
(36) Guevara's fiasco in Bolivia had convinced the Cubans of the
impracticality of having Cuban-led and Cuban-manned guerrilla groups in
another Latin country, because of nationalistic and cultural
sensitivities of the local rebel and CP groups. The DLN's limited budget
also appeared to have dictated this change of tactics.

During the 1970-73 period, Castro complied with the Soviet broad-front
strategy in Latin America by pursuing a policy of ostensibly normalizing
relations with numerous Latin American countries. The rural guerrilla
groups that Cuba had supported in the 1960s remained inactive either
because they no longer qualified for material Cuban aid or Cuba lacked
the resources to support them in any case. Nevertheless, the Castro
regime did maintain ties to those groups, providing them with
safe-haven, training, and propaganda support. (37) Urban terrorists
groups, such as the National Liberation Movement (MLN)/ Tupamaros of
Uruguay, also received low-key Cuban support. After the MLN's defeat in
1972, several hundred members fled to Cuba, where many then underwent
extensive training in military and terrorist tactics, weapons
familiarity, and intelligence methods. (38) The Argentinean Montoneros
and People's Revolutionary Army (ERP) also received tactical and
organizational advice and training in urban and rural guerrilla
techniques in Cuba. (39)

During the 1970-73 period of Salvador Allende's Socialist regime in
Chile, the DLN also trained many members of the Movement of the
Revolutionary Left (MIR), reportedly with North Korean help. The Cubans
supplied the radical left in Chile with large quantities of Soviet- and
Czechoslovakian-made weapons delivered by Cubana Airlines and Cuban
merchant ships. (40) As in Buenos Aires, the Cuban embassy in Santiago
was actively involved in subversive activities, but on a much larger
scale. From their coordinating center in Santiago, the Cubans maintained
liaison with "liberation movements" in Argentina, Bolivia and Uruguay.
(41) According to Robert Moss, about three-quarters of the 150-member
Cuban embassy staff "were thought to be involved in intelligence work."
(42) The Cuban support apparatus apparently extended to La Moneda, the
presidential palace. Moss reported that Cuban operative Fernández de Oña
worked in La Moneda and that a senior DGI officer directly supervised
Allende's foreign communications. (43) Fernández had married Allende's
daughter Beatriz, who later was reported to have committed suicide in
Havana. (44)

As anti-Allende opposition increased during 1973, Castro sent a
handwritten letter to Allende, dated July 29, 1973, informing him that
he was sending DLN chief Piñeiro to Chile under false pretenses for the
purpose of evaluating the situation and offering expert advice. (45)
After his arrival in Santiago on July 30, accompanied by Vice Prime
Minister Carlos Rafael Rodríguez, Piñeiro personally delivered this
letter to Allende. According to former U.S. Ambassador Nathaniel Davis,
Piñeiro and Rodríguez were widely suspected of coming to advise the
government on ways to deal with the mounting political and military
opposition. (46) The two Cuban officials left after five days, having
made private recommendations to Allende. The subsequent firing of two
generals was believed to be one of the recommended measures. (47) After
the military coup and Allende's death, Castro promised Chilean radicals
"all the aid in Cuba's power to provide."

Allende's overthrow thoroughly discredited the Soviet "peaceful road" in
Latin America, and vindicated Castro's "armed struggle" doctrine. Boris
Ponomarev, the CPSU's International Department chief, affirmed in a post
mortem that Communists must be prepared "to reply with revolutionary
violence to the reactionary violence of the bourgeoisie." (48) His
reassessment indicated that the Brezhnev regime had abandoned the
Khrushchev doctrine of "peaceful transition to socialism" in the Third
World in favor of a political military strategy. Robert Leiken points
out that "Soviet tactics underwent major innovations" during this
period, such as the official declaration that "political military
fronts" modeled on Castro's former M-26 could play the vanguard role
previously accorded the CPs. (49)

The creation of the Revolutionary Coordinating Junta (JCR) in Buenos
Aires in February 1974 inaugurated the launching of the Cuban-Soviet
political-military revolutionary strategy in the Southern Cone. Although
the JCR ostensibly was founded as an umbrella coordinating organization
by four South American groups -the Bolivian National Liberation Army
(ELN), the Argentinean ERP, the Chilean MIR, and the Uruguayan MLN- the
DGI was reportedly the organizing force behind it. (50) In the early
1970s, the Cuban embassy in Buenos Aires served as a direct liaison with
the Montoneros and ERP. (51) DA official Roberto Cabrera, then a
presumed DLN operative, began serving as first secretary of the Cuban
embassy in Buenos Aires in mid-1973. (52) (Cabrera reportedly still held
that position in August 1983, in addition to serving as chief of an
unidentified South American Section of the DA. (53) According to Jay
Mallin, however, DA official Damián Arteaga Hernández was serving as
first secretary in Buenos Aires in 1983. (54))

Prospects for "armed struggle" in the Southern Cone appeared bleak with
the military coup in Argentina in 1976 and the subsequent decimation of
the ERP. After police raided the elaborate underground JCR headquarters
outside Buenos Aires in 1977, it moved to Paris. (55) By 1978, the
Montoneros also had been defeated and Cuba allowed its national
leadership to headquarters in Havana. (56) In Paris and other West
European cities, the JCR network reportedly operated in conjunction with
the DGI, running a covert documentation center for forged passports and
identity cards, carrying out fund-raising kidnapping, propagandizing,
and maintaining contact with training camps for Latin Americans in Cuba.
(57) The principal JCR training camp in Cuba was, and reportedly has
remained, a 4,000-acre estate near Guanabo, staffed by Cuban officers. (58)

At a meeting of Latin American CPs in Havana in June 1975, Castro, as
PCC First Secretary, received a formal mandate to unify, coordinate, and
support CPs and other Marxist-Leninist groups and to promote "armed
struggle" in numerous Latin American countries. (59) Castro's only real
concessions were to agree to be more selective about supporting
guerrilla groups and to cooperate with the local CP in each of the
countries where this strategy would be pursued. The policy was in
Castro's own interest because by 1975 he had re-established relations
with ten OAS-member states, and the OAS lifted diplomatic sanctions on
Cuba that July.

The myth that Castro had abandoned "armed struggle" in Latin America in
favor of a good neighbor policy is further belied by article 12(c) of
the Castro regime's first Socialist Constitution, promulgated in
February 1976. It states that Cuba "recognizes the legitimacy of the
wars of national liberation." It also codifies Ponomarev's tenet: "the
right of peoples to repel imperialist and reactionary violence with
revolutionary violence." (60) (Article 28 of the new Soviet
Constitution, adopted in 1977, likewise supports "national liberation"
struggles.)

Following his successful airlifting of Cuban troops to Angola in the
mid-1970s to ensure a Marxist seizure of power, Castro visited Moscow in
early April 1977 and signed an agreement with the Soviets, who pledged
further Communist support for guerrilla movements in Asia, Africa, and
Latin America. A Soviet communiqué stated that Castro and Brezhnev had
resolved to do everything they could "for promoting the international
Communist national liberation movements..." (61) His prestige enhanced,
Castro began focusing on revolutionary prospects in Central America,
where human rights issues had come to the fore.

IV. THE PCC/CC's "GUERRILLA INTERNATIONAL"

In December 1974, Castro reorganized the independent DLN into the
America Department (DA). It was placed under the PCC/CC in order to
centralize Cuban operational control over covert activities required to
implement the new revolutionary strategy. (62) Since then, the PCC/CC's
covert action apparatus for supporting so-called "national liberation
movements" and the subversive efforts of radical regimes in the
hemisphere, namely Nicaragua and formerly Grenada, has been organized
around the DA. This agency plans and coordinates most of Cuba's covert
operations in support of the Cuban-Soviet revolutionary strategy in the
Americas. DA activities include operating secret guerrilla and terrorist
training camps in Cuba, networks for the covert movement of personnel
and material between Cuba and targeted Latin American countries, and an
extensive propaganda apparatus. (63) According to Mallin, DA agents also
have operated in Europe and other regions in support of DA operations in
the Americas. (64)

Singular only in name, the DA is in actuality a Department of the
Americas. Piñeiro organized the DA into four regional sections -Central
America, South America, the Caribbean, and North America- as well as a
Center for Latin American Studies (CEAL), a Center for North American
Studies (CEA), and seven unidentified sections (see Figure 2). (65)
Covers often used by DA officials are as diplomats, employees of Cuba's
Prensa Latina news agency, Cubana Airlines, the Institute for Friendship
With the Peoples (ICAP), and Cuban-front companies. (66) Much of the
activities of Cuba's extensive international media apparatus, cultural
exchanges, and political indoctrination programs are known to be
designed to support covert operations and to promote active solidarity
with or support for "armed struggle" in Latin America. (67)

Castro's formation of the DA under the PCC/CC also reflected his desire
to qualify for Soviet support of his revolutionary program. The former
DLN reportedly had not received any support since its creation in 1969
because the Soviets preferred to channel their ad through the CPs rather
than an independent Cuban agency not under their direct control. The
lack of Soviet support helps to explain Castro's limited aid to
guerrilla groups during the 1969-73 period. Moreover, the DLN reportedly
lost influence in Cuban foreign affairs, whereas the Soviet-controlled
DGI and PCC gained it. Predictably, Castro persuaded the Soviets to
allow him to name Piñeiro as head of the DA. "Red Beard" thereupon
emerged from his relative obscurity as DLN chief since 1969.

Although usually overlooked by most U.S. analysts who analyze Cuba's
revolutionary activities in the hemisphere, the DA, as described by Jay
Mallin -one of the few correspondents, perhaps the only one, to have
reported on the agency in any detail- "is one of the smallest, most
dangerous and least known" of the major intelligence agencies of the
world. (68) Mallin reported in 1983 that the DA had between 200 and 300
members. (69) The DA is dangerous not only because it supports and
guides terrorist organizations, but also because it is effective, as
demonstrated by its successful operation in support of the FSLN in
1978-79. The Nicaraguan resistance appeared to be on the verge of
abandoning its anti-Sandinista war in the fall of 1988, while the
Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN) in El Salvador was
stepping up its "armed struggle," thanks in part to the effectiveness of
DA-conducted lobbying/propaganda campaigns.

The DA draws on the expertise and support of the DGI. (70) According to
The Economist, "There is no hard-an-fast division of labour..." between
the DA and DGI; "they will share their manpower to conduct specific
operations, and many career intelligence officers are transferred back
and forth from the DGI to the [America Department]." (71) Although the
extent of this reported DA-DGI interaction is not clear, there appears
to be a greater division of labor than The Economist report suggests.
For example, one high-level Nicaraguan government security defector,
Miguel Bolaños Hunter revealed that the DA is the "most powerful" branch
of the Cuban security apparatus. According to Bolaños, DA personnel
regard themselves as the elite of the various Cuban security agencies,
and the DA is accorded more respect and prestige in Cuba, as well as
among the Soviets. (72)

DGI support may include providing some funds. According to Major
Florentino Aspillaga Lombard, a former high-ranking MININT security
official who defected to the United States in June 1987, each year
MININT agents stationed abroad customarily bestow Fidel Castro with
millions of Cuban pesos on the occasion of his birthday on August 13.
Castro received 3.7-million Cuban pesos in 1985 and 4.2-million in 1986.
These monies, generated as a result of illicit businesses, are never
deposited in the National Bank of Cuba. Instead, Castro usually deposits
them, presumably not as pesos, in a Swiss bank and spends them to
support favored guerrilla movements or bribe leaders. (73) Aspillaga
complained that Piñeiro's DA had spent "millions and millions" of
dollars trying to make revolution in Latin America, without any positive
result because the peoples have opposed these efforts. (74) Aspillaga
added that DA officials live like kings in Cuba, especially Piñeiro, who
has spent "enormous" sums of money "trying to live well." Carlos Franqui
noted that Piñeiro was living like a baron even in the early 1960s. (75)

The DA's Regional Studies Centers: Two of the fronts used by the DA -CEA
and CEAL- also have been useful in masking the DA's activities in
diplomatic and academic circles. The CEA is part of the DA's North
American Section, which in 1986 was headed by Alfredo García Almeida, a
former member of the Cuban Interests Section in Washington, D.C. (76) In
an article published in early 1988, Jorge Domínguez described the
PCC/CC's CEA as a "new think tank" composed of "Cuban scholars." (77)
His description is misleading in several respects. The CEA, which was
headed in 1986 by DA official Luis Suarez Salazar, (78) is a "think
tank" only in the sense that a few of its members present propagandistic
papers at theoretical or academic conferences, and others study ways to
exploit U.S. security vulnerabilities. In mid-1983, the CEA published,
in Havana, the first issue of the biannual Cuadernos de Nuestra America
(Record of our America), containing articles on such topics as
"Annexationist Trends in the Puerto Rican Political Process" and
"Economic Interests Involved in Military Production in the United States."

In recent years, CEA "scholars" have been invited to conferences of the
Latin American Studies Association (LASA), but were unable to obtain
visas until LASA's meeting in New Orleans in March 1988. At this
conference, the CEA sponsored a panel entitled "Cuba and Central America
in U.S. Foreign Policy." Organized by CEA official Juan Valdés Paz, the
panel's presenters included him and two other CEA "scholars": Julio
Carranza Valdés and Rafael Hernández. Valdés paper dealt with "U.S.
Strategic Foreign Policy in Central America." Manuel Díaz, First
Secretary of the Cuban Interests Section, also appeared at a number of
the meetings on U.S.-Cuban relations. (79)

The non-academic activities of CEA and CEAL officials indicate that they
are actually Communist bloc intelligence operatives. CEA and CEAL
officials play key roles in coordinating terrorist and other subversive
activities in support of Marxist-Leninist groups throughout the
hemisphere. For example, the Cuban Chargé d'Affaires in Nicaragua in the
early 1980s was Luís Hernández Ojeda, a member of the DA's CEAL. (80) In
the late 1970s, Hernández coordinated FSLN operations from Panama.
Another CEAL official, Fernando Comas, also coordinated FSLN operations
and later played an important role in unifying Puerto Rican terrorist
groups.

The DGRE: The PCC/CC's General Department of Foreign Relations (DGRE) is
the Cuban counterpart of the CPSU's International Department and the
Department for Liaison with Communist and Workers' Parties of Socialist
Countries. As such, the DGRE is the Cuban agency responsible for covert
revolutionary activities and overt diplomatic relations with extremist
groups, Communities parties, and radical political parties and regimes
worldwide. Its regional responsibilities are Asia, Eastern Europe,
Middle East, Sub-Sahara Africa, the Soviet Union, and Western Europe
(see Figure2). (81) From 1979 to at least April 1987, Jesús Montané
Oropesa, then an alternate member of the Politburo and a member of the
Secretariat, headed the DGRE. Although said to be one of Fidel Castro's
closest associates, Montané had a reputation as a hard-liner who was
closer to Raúl Castro. (82) By mid-1987, Montané apparently had been
replaced by a much higher-ranking official, Jorge Risquet Valdés, a
member of the PCC's Politburo and Secretariat. (83) Montané was also
dropped from this PCC posts, but remained a PCC/CC member and reportedly
a close Castro adviser, responsible mainly for coordinating Central
American and Caribbean Cps. For example, Montané coordinated a
"consultative meeting of Caribbean anti-imperialist organizations" on
June 11-13, 1984, and headed the Cuban delegation to the so-called First
Central American and Caribbean Solidarity Meeting with Panama on March
29, 1988. (84)

Organizationally, the DA appears to be the DGRE's semi-autonomous
hemispheric division (see Figure 2). The DGRE carries out functions
similar to those of the DA, but in different regions of the world.
Although observers generally agree that Piñeiro answers directly to
Fidel Castro, the two agencies-DA and DGRE-apparently work together to
some extent in conducting relations with foreign groups and governments
under their respective purviews, as well as carrying out support
operations. For example, the DA and DGRE have funneled a variety of
untraceable small arms and ammunition to guerrilla groups through an
international network of 130 Cuban-owned front companies operating in
eleven Latin American and three African countries, as well as Canada,
Japan, and much of Western Europe. (85) There is also probably some
personnel interaction between the two agencies. One official, Germán
Sánchez, was reported in 1983 as chief of unidentified sections in both
the DGRE and DA, but in 1986 he was with the DGRE only. (86)

V. THE NICARAGUAN REVOLUTIONARY MODEL

After the FSLN's Third Line guerrilla faction opened an impressive
countrywide offensive against the Somoza regime in October 1977, Castro
decided to make Nicaragua the DA's first Central American target. Manuel
Piñeiro's deputy, Armando Estrada Fernández, began making numerous
clandestine trips to the region to both promote the unification of the
three FSLN factions and lay the groundwork for an arms supply network.
(87) Estrada was a former chief of the DGI's Middle East and Africa
sections, with experience in training Palestinian guerrillas. (88) The
Cubans also began training FSLN guerrilla forces in Cuba. The KGB is
believed to have assisted the Cuban efforts to train, fund, and arm the
FSLN. (89)

In September 1978, Cuban arms, other supplies, and Cuban-trained FSLN
members arrived at staging sites in northern Costa Rica via small
aircraft flown from Panama, and later in Panamanian Air Force planes.
(90) Cuban news media reported the arrival in Havana of the FSLN's
senior leader, Tomás Borge, on September 26, his reception by Estrada,
and his meeting with Castro on the 27th. By the end of the year, arms
began arriving in Costa Rica directly from Cuba. Accompanying them were
members of the elite Special Troops (Spetsnaz) from the MININT's
Directorate of Special Operations (DOE) to oversee the equipping of the
rebels and to help coordinate guerrilla operations. (91) On December 26,
the Cubans announced the decision of the FSLN factions to merge.

In early 1979, DA agents helped to organize, arm, and transport an
International Brigade to fight with the FSLN. A senior DA guerrilla
warfare specialist, Pedro González Piñero (Commander "Justo"), served as
the field adviser to the brigade. (92) By that April, the FSLN factional
leaders had formed a unified FSLN National Directorate as a result of a
series of talks in Havana with Fidel Castro and DA officials. (93)

When Carlos Andrés Pérez's tenure as President of Venezuela ended that
spring, the FSLN's principal foreign source of logistical support dried
up. (94)

Consequently, Cuba became the FSLN's main supplier of military material
and other essential support. (95) This change of foreign patron states
usually has been ignored by those who view Cuba's role in the Nicaraguan
revolution as insignificant. During the 1978-79 period, there were at
least twenty-one flights between Cuba and Costa Rica carrying war
material for the FSLN; a minimum of 500 tons of arms destined for the
Sandinista forces were airlifted to Costa Rica from Cuba and elsewhere.
(96) According to Aspillaga, however, a total of fifty-seven flights
were made between Havana and Costa Rica, for a total of 1.8-million tons
(as stated) of arms; Piñeiro personally supervised the loading
operations at Havana airport. Julián Díaz, then chief of the DA's
Central American Section, directed the Cubans' main operations
center-based in San José Costa Rica-for coordinating logistics and
contacts with the FSLN and monitoring the airlift. (97) When the FSLN
launched its final offensive in mid-1979, Special Troops from the
MININT's DOE were with Sandinista columns and maintained direct radio
communications with Havana. (98)

After Somoza's ouster by the Cuban-supported FSLN forces in July 1979,
Nicaragua quickly became a base of operations for the Cubans,
particularly the DA. By mid-1979, the DA-now working through Nicaragua-
had begun to impose the victorious "Nicaraguan model" on
Marxist-Leninist movements in El Salvador, Guatemala, the Caribbean,
Colombia, and Chile. (99) Expanding on the aforementioned Cuban-Soviet
model, Cuban aid was made conditional on the successful implementation
of a strategy of prolonged guerrilla warfare combining ultimately with
urban insurrection and supported politically by a broad front of
non-Communist opposition groups. Despite the contentions of those who
minimize the Cuban-Soviet role, this model was not an endogenous
Nicaraguan variety of revolution. (100)

Quietly taking credit for the revolution, the Soviets joined the Cubans
in declaring the Nicaraguan model a "correct" revolutionary paradigm for
other Central American nations. Z. Zagladin, deputy chief of the CPSU's
International Department, linked the "victory of Nicaragua" to
Soviet/Cuban-supported "anti-imperialist" strategy and expressed the
hope that Nicaragua will have its "continuators." (101)

Following the FSLN's victory, the Soviets began to urge certain Latin
American CPs to coordinate with guerrilla groups and agreed that
"political-military fronts" should play the primary role in the creation
of united fronts. Although the CP would remain the inheritor of
revolution, it would concede the role of instigator to the
"political-military front." (102) The CPs of Central America, Panama,
and Mexico adopted the new Soviet line at a clandestine meeting held in
October 1980. (103) (The Communist Party of El Salvador [PCES] already
had decided by April 1979 to convert its entire party apparatus into a
military-oriented organization. (104)) Nicaragua's ruling FSLN leaders
have assisted the Cubans in playing an active role in promoting the
Soviet policy of furthering cooperation between Latin American CPs and
guerrilla groups. (105)

In a paper presented to Latin American revolutionaries attending the
International Theoretical Conference in Havana on April 27, 1982, DA
chief Manuel Piñeiro reaffirmed the viability of the political-military
model. He advocated the antithesis of the old Guevarist doctrine by
arguing that "revolutionary strategy can be efficacious only to the
extent that it adapts itself to the specific realities of each country"
and "the strategic objectives of the revolution." (106) Because each
revolutionary movement is different, Piñeiro reasoned, "only a
political-military strategic conception and the corresponding training
and preparation" will enable the guerrilla groups to implement the new
revolutionary strategy effectively. (107) Piñeiro argued further that
"the consistent and opportune use of arms" is an "important factor" that
"combined with the unity of the masses... in our opinion guarantees the
triumph of the genuine revolutionaries." (108)

VI. CASTRO'S NICARAGUAN "ROBOT"

Castro and Piñeiro have understandably been confident about their
prospects for spreading subversion in Latin America in view of the
remarkable success of the Cuban diplomatic stratagem in South America in
disguising the true nature of Cuban activities in the region; the
increasing Cubanization of Nicaragua; the conflict between the White
House and Congress over support for the anti-Sandinista resistance; and
the growing transnational guerrilla and terrorist cooperation in Latin
America.

On August 30, 1984, Piñeiro cited four reasons for his optimism about
revolutionary trends despite the Grenada setback: (1) the Cuban
revolution was stronger than ever; (2) Somoza no longer ruled in
Nicaragua; (3) the oligarchy cannot destroy the revolutionary movement
in El Salvador; and (4) representative democracies in Latin America were
rebelling against "imperialist domination." (109) Significantly, Piñeiro
did not say that the Sandinistas rule in Nicaragua, only that Somoza no
longer ruled. After all, the Cubans give the orders, or, more
specifically, Fidel Castro. Aspillaga, who once served as a Cuban
intelligence adviser to the Sandinista leaders, stated in August 1987
that, "The one who is controlling Nicaragua is Fidel, and that control
today is total...."

An early indication of the central role that the DA would play in the
Cuban-Nicaraguan relationship was Manuel Piñeiro's attendance at a
meeting in Havana on July 27, 1979, at which diplomatic ties between the
two countries were re-established after a quarter-century interruption.
(110) On that occasion, DA official Julián López Díaz was named
Ambassador to Nicaragua. (111)

Piñeiro's prominent role in Cuba's relationship with the Sandinista
regime in Nicaragua was underscored by his attendance at the first
anniversary celebration of the FSLN-Cuban takeover, held in Managua in
July 1980. (112) On that occasion, according to Robert Moss's sources,
Castro, Piñeiro, and PCC Secretary General René Theodore held a secret
meeting in Monimbó, Nicaragua, with Central American revolutionaries and
Cuban agents from the United States. Castro reportedly boasted to the
congregation that Cuba would spread revolution throughout Central
America and develop the capacity to spark a race war in the United
States. (113) In August 1980, Piñeiro reiterated Castro's plans at
another secret meeting with terrorists held in Caracas, Venezuela. (114)

In January 1985, Fidel Castro, accompanied by Manuel Piñeiro, paid the
Sandinista leaders an unannounced, surprise visit on the occasion of
Daniel Ortega's investiture as president. Castro's action reflected the
Cuban colonialist attitude in Nicaragua that Antonio Farach, a former
Nicaraguan diplomat in Venezuela who defected in September 1983,
commented on in testimony to Congress. Farach stated:

I can affirm that... in my experience with Cuban officials during four
years of service in the government, the relationship was never one of
respect between Cubans and Nicaraguans. The Cubans always spoke as if
they were the bosses. They were always very arrogant and demanding. They
do not suggest in Nicaragua, they order in Nicaragua. (115)

The Cuban military and security advisers who are reported to be
stationed in Nicaragua, numbering between 2,500 and 3,000, are known to
operate at all levels of the government and the Sandinista People's Army
(EPS). (116) The Cubans in Nicaragua constitute a de facto ruling class,
even controlling who enters and leaves the country. According to Farach,
Nicaragua's Office of Immigration and Naturalization "is absolutely
controlled by Cuban government officials." (117) Sandinista defector
Alvaro Baldizón confirmed that Cuban influence in Nicaragua's Interior
Ministry (MINT) is extensive and Cuban advice and observations are
treated as though they were orders. (118) (The MINT is the regime's law
enforcement/internal security arm and is regarded as an EPS component.)

Castro's Nicaraguan "robot" is more than willing to do its fair share of
"revolutionary internationalism." Articles 8 and 9 of Nicaragua's
Socialist Constitution indicate the regime's expansionist intentions by
declaring that the Nicaraguan people are an "integral part of the
Central American nation" and that Nicaragua will spare no efforts to
achieve "political and economic integration" in the region-i.e., to
export the Nicaraguan revolution. (119)

The Cubans, by operating within the Nicaraguan military, intelligence ,
and security services (created as virtual clones of their Cuban
counterparts) have expertly concealed the extent of their efforts to
support and direct destabilization activities throughout Latin America.
By mid-1980, the principal Nicaraguan agencies used by the Cubans to
coordinate "national liberation" efforts in the region had been
established (see Figure 3).

The FSLN's International Relations Directorate (DRI), which was closely
modeled after the DA, represents the FSLN's 12-member ruling National
Directorate, particularly in its dealings with other Communist states
and revolutionary movements. (120) The DRI is also responsible for
establishing and maintaining support networks for the General
Directorate of State Security (DGSE), which is the Sandinista secret
police, and the Fifth Directorate of Intelligence, which is Nicaragua's
"DGI." Cuba's assistance in support of Nicaragua's guerrilla support
apparatus included setting up Cuban-style front companies for acquiring
arms and munitions. (121) The Fifth Directorate is headed by "Renán
Montero Corrales," the DA agent whose real name is reportedly Andrés
Barahona López. (122) Also identified by the pseudonym "the old man,"
Barahona was a colonel in the Cuban intelligence service and alleged
comrade-in-arms of Ché Guevara in Bolivia. Castro Hidalgo noted in his
book that "Renán," "served as a liaison between the DGI and Guevara in
Bolivia." (123) According to Bolaños, Barahona was ordered to work with
the FSLN in the late 1960s. Barahona served as an assistant to DA
official Julian López Díaz during the FSLN's war against Somoza in the
late 1970s. Tomás Borge, who became the Sandinista regime's interior
minister, was so pleased with Barahona's work that he asked Fidel Castro
to allow him to remain permanently in Nicaragua. (124) After the FSLN
takeover, Barahona was redocumented as a Nicaraguan citizen and made de
facto head of the DGSE. (125)

DRI chief Julio López Campo reports directly to the National
Directorate, just as Piñeiro reports directly to Fidel Castro. According
to Bolaños, "Montero" coordinates with López Campo on a daily basis on
all important political affairs. (126) The other Cuban advisers to the
DRI are all DA personnel. (127) Aspillaga affirmed that, "All of the key
advisers in the Nicaraguan government, including the chief of
intelligence, known by the code-name 'the old man' [Barahona] are Cuban
intelligence officers."

The 4,000-member DGSE, which Bolaños noted was ten times the size of the
late Somoza's secret police, has specific responsibility for all cases
involving national security and counter-revolutionary activity. Bolaños
described it as modeled after Cuba's State Security Department (DSE) and
DGI. (128) He added that the DGSE staff in 1983 included 400 Cubans,
seventy Russians, forty to fifty East Germans, and twenty to twenty-five
Bulgarians. (129) The Soviets reportedly concentrated on intelligence
operations, while the Cubans concerned themselves and
counterintelligence. (130) Cuban Brigadier General Rafael del Pino, who
defected to the United States in May 1987, confirmed that some 300 to
400 Cuban advisers in Nicaragua actually were intelligence operatives
assigned to create "a Nicaraguan robot" that will follow Cuba's lead in
spreading revolution. (131) Moscow-trained Lenin Cerna Suárez headed the
DGSE's counterintelligence department from its inception until 1988,
answering to Vice Interior Minister Luís Carrión Cruz, who was
theoretically responsible for the entire Nicaraguan security apparatus.
(132) Bolaños affirmed, however, that a Cuban general ("Roberto")
exercised "100-percent control" over all the Cuban advisers in
Nicaragua, as well as the Nicaraguan security apparatus. (133) In March
1988, Cerna was appointed to Carrion's position as MINT vice minister. (134)

The Directorate commander who oversees Nicaraguan subversive activities
is Bayardo Arce, also vice coordinator of its Executive Commission.
Arce's "Bureau" is actually a clandestine government agency through
which the Sandinista leaders and their Cuban advisers support guerrilla
and terrorist groups throughout the region. Arce maintains close contact
with the Soviet bloc. He returned to Managua on March 16, 1988, after
visiting Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the Soviet Union, Poland, Yugoslavia,
and the German Democratic Republic to update unspecified "cooperation
and assistance agreements." (135) He also hosts visiting representatives
of foreign terrorist organizations. For example, he met in Managua on
June 25, 1987, with a delegation of the Palestine Liberation
Organization (PLO). (136)

Nicaragua serves as a support center not only for Central American
extremists, but also for South American, West European, and Middle
Eastern terrorist organizations. About thirty "internationalists" groups
reportedly have offices or representatives in Nicaragua and form part of
the support system for subversion and terrorism in Latin America. (137)
The DRI is responsible for maintaining contact with members of foreign
terrorist organizations in Nicaragua, such as the Basque Fatherland and
Freedom (ETA) and the Italian Red Brigades. (138)

The DA and DGI undoubtedly use Cuban diplomatic offices in Nicaragua as
operational centers for directing Cuba's destabilization programs in
Central America. With more than 100 staffers, the Cuban embassy in
Managua is said to be larger than any Western embassy in that capital,
and the Cubans operate at least three consulates around the country.
(139) In fact, those who have held the Cuban ambassadorial post in
Nicaragua have been DA agents. (140) DA official Julián López Díaz
served as Cuban ambassador to Nicaragua from July 1979 to October 1987,
when he was replaced by Norberto Hernández Curbelo, a DA vice chief. (141)

Five days after the presidents of Central America signed the Central
America peace plan in August 1987, Daniel Ortega went to Havana to
consult with Castro on the agreement and the future of Cuban advisers in
Nicaragua. (142) The fact that Ortega was accompanied by DRI chief Julio
López and met with both Castro and Piñeiro indicated that the subject of
peace was not a priority topic on the agenda. (143) In early November
1897, Daniel Ortega reminded the world where his true sympathies lie by
traveling to Moscow to attend the Soviet Union's 70th anniversary
celebrations and the Party Congress meeting. During a stopover in Havana
enroute to Moscow, Ortega again met with Piñeiro. (144) Cuba's new
ambassador to Nicaragua, Norberto Hernández, was also present for what
appeared to be a DA strategy session with Cuba's Nicaraguan puppet.

VII. EXPORTING THE NICARAGUAN MODEL

To ascertain how the DA, with the aid of its Nicaraguan surrogate, has
fared in its efforts to systematize the political-military model of
guerrilla warfare elsewhere in Latin America since 1979, individual
country assessments follow.

CENTRAL AMERICA

El Salvador

Soon after Somoza's ouster, the DA support network in Costa Rica shifted
its activities toward support of Salvadoran guerrilla groups by
establishing training camps and the beginning of arms supply systems in
Costa Rica, Honduras, and Nicaragua. (145) The principal DA coordinator
for this effort, Fernando Comas Pérez, operated first out of the secret
DA operations center in San José, Costa Rica, and later directly from
the Cuban consulate, where he held the title of vice consul.

After El Salvador's right wing military regime was overthrown in a
reformist civil-military coup on October 15, 1979, unification of the
five Salvadoran guerrilla groups became Cuba's priority. By May 1980,
Castro had pressured the Salvadoran Communist Party, (PCES) and rebel
leaders into forming the Unified Revolutionary Directorate (DRU) to
serve as the high command for political-military planning. (146)
Advisers from the Cuban MININT's DOE then began helping DRU leaders with
initial war plans that summer. (147)

Cuban efforts to force the Salvadoran rebels to take the bigger step of
establishing a united guerrilla front faltered because of persistent
rivalries and less than unanimous approval of the growing Cuban role. In
August 1980, the Armed Forces of National Resistance (FARN), then headed
by Ernesto Jovel, withdrew from the DRU over a dispute with Joaquín
Villalobos of the People's Revolutionary ARMY (ERP). The dispute was
settled after Jovel's private plane plunged into the Pacific on
September 22 while enroute to Panama. (148) The FARN, under Jovel's
pro-Cuban successor, José Eduardo Sancho Castañeda ("Fermán
Cienfuegos"), rejoined the DRU, thereby enabling the formation that fall
of the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN) and a resumption
of Cuban arms shipments. According to Arquimedes Canadas, a former FMLN
guerrilla field commander ("Alejandro Montenegro") who defected in May
1983, "The Cubans killed him [Jovel] because he was always openly
opposed to Cuba's plans." (149) Canadas also explained that it was Cuban
policy to sanction the assassination of rebel leaders who resisted Cuban
pressure to unify and submit to Cuban direction. (150)

As amply documented by the U.S. State Department, the Cubans directed
the major flow of U.S.-made arms from Vietnam to the FMLN between
October 1980 and February 1981. (151) DA official Fernando Comas
coordinated the FMLN arms supply operation from the Cuban consulate in
San José, using a Costa Rican-based air express company operated by
Fernando Carrasco, a member of the Chilean MIR. (152)

Since 1981, Cuba is known to have supported-with training, arms, and
munitions-several major operations carried out by the FMLN. These have
included the bombing of the Golden Bridge in October 1981, the sabotage
of seventy-five percent of the Salvadoran Air Force at the Ilopango Air
Base in January 1982, and the bloody assault on the 4th Brigade
Headquarters in El Paraiso in December 1983. Adin Inglés Alvarado, a
guerrilla captain until his defection in early 1985, stated that he and
twenty-seven other rebels went to Cuba to plan and train for that
attack. (153) He added that Cuba supplied the weapons and ammunition
used in the raid (in which 100 soldiers were killed). "Besides the
training," he said, "they have us all the material to use. The
explosives, machine-guns, and ammunition were totally sent from Cuba.
Nicaragua was only the conduit, or staging point."

Another senior rebel defector, Napoleón Romero, affirmed in a press
interview in April 1985 that, "Nicaragua" is a directional center of the
FMLN... there they give us advice, the Sandinistas as well as the
Cubans." (154) Salvadoran guerrilla documents, captured in 1985,
provided evidence of assistance given the FMLN by Cuba, Nicaragua, the
Soviet Union, Bulgaria, and Vietnam. (155) Manuel Piñeiro, apparently
alluding to reports that Cuba had reduced its arms support of the FMLN,
told a visiting U.S. official in early 1985 that Cuba would continue its
aid to the FMLN and other guerrilla forces in Latin America and will do
nothing to undercut the FMLN or the Sandinista regime. (156)

On June 19, 1985, the Cuban-advised FMLN launched a new terrorist
campaign against the U.S. presence in El Salvador when urban commandos
of the Revolutionary Party of Central American Workers (PRTC)
machine-gunned to death four U.S. Marine embassy guards and nine
civilians-including two U.S. businessmen, a Chilean, two Guatemalans,
and four Salvadorians- and wounded 15 others at a sidewalk café in San
Salvador. In October 1985, the FMLN staged two other major operations
that must have required Cuban approval: a raid on a Salvadoran army
garrison housing U.S. trainers and the kidnapping of President José
Napoleón Duarte's daughter. Negotiations for her release were channeled
through Managua. In order to win her freedom, President Duarte
capitulated and provided safe conduct out of the country to 104 wounded
guerrillas and twenty-two others. Piñeiro received the rebels on their
arrival at the Havana airport. (157)

Piñeiro initiated Cuba's 1987 campaign of support for the FMLN by
attending an FMLN/PCES "solidarity meeting" in Havana in January. (158)
On March 31, FMLN guerrillas again overran the 4th Brigade Headquarters,
killing at least sixty-four soldiers and a U.S. military trainer,
President Duarte stated in a television interview that this attack may
also have been planned with Cuban technical assistance and training
because of the greatly increased accuracy of the guerrilla mortar
barrage on the garrison. (159) Duarte told a U.S. congressional
delegation in September that the Sandinista regime had "dramatically
increased" shipments of military hardware to the FMLN since the Central
American peace proposal was initiated. (160) The FMLN country-wide
offensive in the fall of 1988 featured another bloody attack on the El
Paraiso garrison, as well as car bombings and a mortar attack in San
Salvador.

Guatemala

In the spring of 1980, DA agents began to actively press the four main
Guatemalan guerrilla factions to unify to qualify for increased Cuban
aid. That June, the rebel leaders sent a letter to Fidel Castro
reporting that, as a result of their first meeting in Managua, they
agreed "to do everything necessary" to achieve unity and to coordinate
their military activities. (161) By signing an agreement in Managua on
November 2, the guerrilla leaders initiated the process to establish the
Guatemalan National Revolutionary Union (URNG), under an executive
directorate called the General Revolutionary Command. Piñeiro, together
with Ramiro Abreu Quintana, an official of the DA's Central America
Section, represented Castro at the signing ceremony. (162) The guerrilla
leaders then traveled to Havana to present the accord to Castro.

The URNG itself was not formally established until February 1982. (163)
By 1985, operational cooperation among URNG forces appeared to have
increased as they inflicted growing numbers of casualties on the
Guatemalan Army in isolated rural areas. In 1988, URNG forces continued
to wage Central America's second most active Castroite insurgency.

Honduras

In 1980, the Sandinista regime began to provide logistical support,
training, and advice for the Castroite Honduran extremist groups,
primarily in order to incorporate them into the logistics network for
the transfer of arms to the FMLN in El Salvador. (164) One pro-Cuban
group, the Lorenzo Zelaya Popular Revolutionary from (FPR-LZ), ambushed
a vehicle in which five U.S. military advisers were riding in
Tegucigalpa on September 23, 1981in wounding two of them. Documents
captured in a police raid on a safe-house of the Honduran Front for
Popular Liberation (FHLP) in Tegucigalpa on November 17, 1981, indicated
that the FHLP was created in Nicaragua by high-level Sandinista leaders,
was headquartered in Managua, and its members received military training
in Nicaragua and Cuba. (165) Members of other Honduran terrorist groups
who perpetrated aircraft hijacking and hostage-taking operations in the
1981-82 period were given sanctuary in Cuba. The promise of more
significant Cuban support inspired the three main Honduran terrorist
groups to coordinate under the National Unity Directorate of the
Revolutionary Movement of Honduras (DNU-MRH) in March 1983. The Honduran
Army defeated two attempts by rebels-trained and supported by Cuba and
Nicaragua-to establish a base for rural insurgency in the country in
1983-84. Since then, occasional raids by security forces against
terrorist safe-houses in Honduran cities have indicated continued
organizational activity. (166) In April 1985, seven agents of the
Nicaraguan DGSE were captured inside Honduras and confessed to their
role in supplying arms to subversive groups in Honduras. (167) In July
1988, the Cinchonero Popular Liberation Movement (MPL), citing "the
heroic people of Vietnam, Cuba, and Nicaragua," claimed responsibility
for an attack on a group of off-duty U.S. soldiers. (168)

Costa Rica

In early May 1981, Costa Rica suspended consular relations with Cuba
over charges of arms smuggling, and expelled the Cubans assigned to the
Cuban consulate in San José, including DA regional coordinator Fernando
Comas. (169) The action followed an unprecedented outbreak of terrorism
in Costa Rica by an international Marxist-Leninist group now known as
the New Republic Movement (MRN), whose leader has close ties to Cuba and
Nicaragua. (170) The Cubans then unleashed their Sandinista surrogates.
Sandinista agents staged or attempted to carry out several terrorist
actions in Costa Rica in the 1981-82 period. (171) Sandinista-supported
groups also conducted a series of attacks in Costa Rica between 1981 and
1985. On March 17, 1981, one of these terrorist commandos, "The Family,"
blew up a van in which three U.S. Marine embassy guards were riding in
San José, seriously wounding one of them.

Cuba and Nicaragua have continued to prepare the groundwork for future
"armed struggle" in Costa Rica. According to the Costa Rican Ministry of
Public Security, by July 1985 at least 700 Costa Rican leftists had
received military training in Cuba over the previous four years, and
most already had returned to their country through Nicaragua. (172)
Major elements of the orthodox Costa Rican CP, the Popular Vanguard
Party (PVP), have gained military experience fighting anti-Sandinista
rebels in Nicaragua since the early 1980s and have continued to provide
permanent training services for paramilitary cadres who return to Costa
Rica. (173) Former Sandinista security official Baldizón confirmed the
training of PVP members in southern Nicaragua for six-month periods.
(174) After a five-year lull, anti-U.S. terrorism reappeared in San José
in April 1988 when a terrorist tossed a powerful fragmentation grenade
at several persons in front of the American-Costa Rican Cultural Center,
wounding two U.S. women-one seriously-and four other persons.

Panama

The DA has used Panama to facilitate Cuban support for guerrilla groups
in Central America. Piñeiro apparently has long-standing ties to Panama
Defense Forces (PDF) Commander Manuel Antonio Noriega. In November 1975,
Piñeiro headed a high-level Cuban mission to Panama and met with top
Panamanian government officials, including Noriega, then the G-2
(intelligence) chief. (175) That year, Piñeiro was advising the late
Panamanian dictator General Omar Torrijos in negotiating the Panama
Canal Treaties. (176) During 1978-79, the DA made extensive use of
Panama to ferry arms to the FSLN guerrilla forces in Costa Rica and
Nicaragua. As DA operations chief, Luís Hernández Ojeda coordinated FSLN
operations from Panama and maintained direct contact with Piñeiro in
Havana. (177) Piñeiro attended Torrijos' funeral in Panama in August
1981. (178) by that time, Cuba maintained its second largest embassy in
Panama City and it reportedly has served as a focal point for
Soviet-Cuban coordination of revolutionary activities in the region.
(179) Aspillaga charged that Cuba's MININT Minister José Abrantes
Fernández has had a close association with Noriega, through whom Cuba
has supplied arms to Nicaragua and guerrillas in El Salvador and
Honduras, as well as in Colombia. (180) In September 1982, Piñeiro
accompanied Cuban Politburo member Osmany Cienfuegos on another official
visit to Panama. (181) In 1983, according to Jay Mallin, the DA post in
Panama was staffed by about a half dozen DA officials and was
responsible for Colombia and for serving as a link to Central American
operations. (182)

According to the U.S. Department of Commerce, about twenty of the sixty
Cuban front companies operating in Panama in 1986 had been involved with
providing weapons to Latin American guerrilla groups. (183) Aspillaga
affirmed that Noriega helped Havana to purchase and send weapons to
guerrilla groups in El Salvador, Honduras, and Colombia, as well as to
Nicaragua. (184) CIMEX, one of the Panamanian trading companies set-up
by Cuban agents, played a central role in arranging some of the arms
purchases.

In February 1988, a federal grand jury in Miami indicted Noriega for
drug trafficking and racketeering. As a result, the United States
finally began pressuring the corrupt dictator to leave Panama,
emboldening the political opposition in Panama to also clamor for his
departure, at least until the regime cracked down on it. Finding himself
increasingly isolated, Noriega turned to the Cubans for help. High-level
Cuban intelligence officers reportedly began visiting Noriega to advise
him on how to deal with the situation and calm tensions within the PDF.
(185)

By mid-March 1988, Noriega and the Cubans reportedly were operating a
secret arms airlift from Havana to three locations in Panama and outside
the control of the PDF, with the intent of building an infrastructure
for waging guerrilla war, according to Major Augusto Villalaz, a
Panamanian Air Force officer who was granted political asylum in the
United States that month. (186) Villalaz revealed that he personally
made three flights from Cuba into Panama to deliver weapons requested by
Noriega; each flight carried sixteen tons of military equipment,
including 100,000 AK-47 assault rifles, rocket-propelled grenades,
hand-grenades, and ammunition. Villalaz added that a total of sixteen
flights carrying about 500,000 pounds of weapons were planned. (187)

Eduardo Arango, ousted President Eric Delvalle's consul general in
London, charged that the weapons shipments were being unloaded by
Panamanian political cadres and technicians who had been trained 'by the
hundreds" in Cuba and the Soviet Union over the years. (188) Cubans and
allied guerrilla forces also reportedly began arriving in Panama (189)
By mid-April, the infiltrators had increased to 1,800 Cubans and
Nicaraguans, although confirmation was lacking. (190)

Also by that month, Noriega reportedly was becoming increasingly reliant
on Cuban military advisers. (191) The DA had reportedly established a
political unit in Panama to advise Noriega. (192) Among its members were
"Luís Arbezu" (sic) (probably DA vice chief José Antonio Arbesú Fraga);
DA vice chief Fernando Ravelo, who coordinated Colombian M-19 support
for Noriega; Ramiro Abreu Quintana, the DA's Central American Section
chief; José Luís Ojalvo; and CEAL official Luís Hernández Ojeda. (193)
Arbesú, reputed to be an expert in manipulating the U.S. political
system and media, presumably was advising the less astute Panamanian
dictator on ways of countering the U.S. pressure campaign against him.

Nicaraguan security officials were reported to be serving a role in
Panama similar to that of Cuba. Bayardo Arce reportedly was directing
the Nicaraguan operation from Managua, while Ricardo Wheelock, an
intelligence chief, was directing Nicaraguan "military" efforts in
Panama and serving as a liaison between Noriega and Nicaraguan Defense
Minister Humberto Ortega. DRI chief Julio López and Vice Interior
Minister Lenin Cerna also reportedly were operating in Panama under the
direction of Arce and Wheelock, respectively. (194)

THE CARIBBEAN

Jamaica

Having made former Prime Minister Michael Manle's close relations with
Cuba a major issue during the 1980 election campaign, Edward Seaga-in
his first official act as a prime minister in January 1981-terminated
Cuba's programs in Jamaica. Seaga also expelled the 500 or so Cubans
working on the island, including Cuban Ambassador Armando Ulises
Estrada, a DA vice chief, for his involvement in an arms smuggling
operation. (195) Although the Seaga government stopped short of severing
diplomatic ties with Cuba at that time and allowed a few Cuban embassy
officials to remain, it broke relations on October 29, 1981. In a
further action in November 1983, Seaga expelled a Cuban journalist and
four Soviet diplomats, whom he identified as KGB agents, for espionage
and conspiracy to murder a protocol officer at the Jamaican Ministry of
Foreign Affairs. (196)

Cuba's Grenada setback of October 1983 strained relations with the local
Moscow-line, violence-oriented CP, the Workers Party of Jamaica (WPJ),
which was critical of Castro's unsupportive attitude toward the
Marxist-Leninist hard-liners who ousted and assassinated Prime Minister
Maurice Bishop, a friend of Castro's. (197) Cuban-WPJ relations began to
improve, however, by November 1984, when Cuban representatives attended
the WPJ's fifth-anniversary ceremony in Kingston. (198) In recent years,
the WPJ has been implicated in several major bank robberies. Other
subversive acts perpetrated by unidentified groups have included raids
on police stations.

Grenada

Reports of Cuban participation in the expertly planned and executed
overthrow of Eric Gairy's unpopular regime by a few dozen members of
Maurice Bishop's New Jewel Movement (NJM) in March 1979 were never
substantiated. Nevertheless, one early Cuban connection was Oscar
Cárdenas Junquera, a DA official who worked with the NJM in Grenada
before the coup. (199) After Grenada's opening of diplomatic relations
with Cuba on April 14, 1979, another senior DA official, Julián Torres
Rizo, was sent to Grenada as the Cuban ambassador in order to supervise
Cuba's programs in Grenada. (200) According to DGI defector Gerardo
Peraza, Torres Rizo had served as one of the most active DGI officers in
both Cuba and the United States. (201) Torres Rizo also had served as
Cuba's ambassador to Dominica and St. Lucia. (202)

With Their virtual carte blanche in Grenada, the Cubans and Soviets made
the island the focal point of anti-democratic activities in the Eastern
Caribbean. The 35,000 pounds of secret NJM and Cuban documents captured
in the occupation of Grenada in late October 1983 yielded some
documentary evidence of the close subversive collaboration among the DA,
NJM, and FSLN. For example, one report in Spanish on Nicaragua and the
Socialist International (SI), signed by Piñeiro, shows how the NJM and
Sandinista activists, acting under DA direction, sought to undermine the
regional SI meeting held in Managua on January 6-7. 1983. (203) Another
document, also signed by Piñeiro, is a secret NJM-PCC agreement
providing for the training of Grenadians in Cuba. (204)

In addition to Torres Rizo, two other DA officials were reported to be
in Grenada at the time of the military action. Carlos Díaz Larrañaga,
who had arrived on the island only a day earlier, was one of the
twenty-four Cubans killed in the fighting. (205) The other DA agent,
Gastón Díaz Evarista, previously had served in Barbados and on the DA's
Jamaica desk. (206) Since the U.S. intervention in Grenada in 1983,
however, Cuba has maintained a low profile in its subversive efforts in
the Eastern Caribbean.

SOUTH AMERICA

Suriname

Suriname was an economically prosperous, five-year old democracy when
Sergeant Desire "Desi" Bouterse seized power in a February 25, 1980,
coup. Under Bouterse's repressive and incompetent rule, the former Dutch
colony became South America's "Angola." Cuban activities in support of
Bouterse's security and military forces began growing after the arrival
in September 1982 of the new Cuban ambassador, Oscar Cárdenas. (207) A
PCC member and former head of the DA's Central American Section,
Cárdenas was an unusually high ranking ambassador for a country as small
as Suriname. He was also described as a highly successful DGI operator.
(208) Only three months after his arrival, Bouterse's Cuban-trained and
advised security forces rounded up and massacred fifteen prominent
political opponents under the pretext of a coup attempt. With the
subsequent cut-off of Dutch assistance to Suriname, Cuban influence
increased. During the year that he spent in Paramaribo, Cárdenas
reportedly became involved in almost every aspect of government
business. (209) He also maintained close ties to the Marxist-oriented
People's Revolutionary Party (RVP). (210) Cuban Advisers-allowed to come
and go freely-trained Bouterse's personal bodyguard and advised the
Suriname Ministries of Information and People's Mobilization. (211)

Coincidentally, on the same day as the joint Caribbean/U.S. intervention
in Grenada on October 25, 1983, Bouterse, fearful that he could suffer
the same fate that befell his friend Maurice Bishop, expelled the Cubans
from Suriname. Although the Bouterse regime announced a few weeks later
that it placed a high priority on improving relations with Havana, the
Cubans apparently turned their subversive attentions elsewhere.

Colombia

According to the State Department, Fidel Castro decided in early 1979 to
allow Cuba to be used as "a bridge and support base" for narcotics
traffickers as a means to aid Cuba economically and contribute to the
"deterioration of American society." (212) That August, Cuban Ambassador
to Colombia and DA Vice Chief Fernando Renedo and First Secretary
Gonzalo Bassols Suárez, also a DA operative, began developing a
relationship with Colombian narcotics trafficker Jaime Guillot Lara.
(213) The development of Cuba's Colombian narco-connection coincided
with the M-19's takeover of the Dominican Republic embassy in Bogotá in
early 1980. The U.S. ambassador to Colombia, Diego Asencio, was among
the thirty diplomats taken hostage by the M-19. Asencio notes in his
account of the ordeal that almost as soon as he arrived at the embassy,
the Soviet bloc envoys started to leave en masse, moments before the
terrorist attack. (214) After sixty-one days, the crisis was resolved
peacefully with the aid of Ravelo, who arranged for the terrorists,
their $2.5 million ransom booty, and a dozen diplomatic hostages to be
flown by Cubana Airlines directly to Havana. Asencio noted that Manuel
Piñeiro was on hand at the Havana airport to officially welcome the
terrorists as heroes. (215)

According to the State Department, official Cuban protection of
Guillot's drug trafficking network began in the summer of 1980. (216)
The additional purpose of the arrangement was to help finance Latin
American guerrilla activities, as well as to utilize the capabilities
and expertise of the narcotics traffickers to smuggle weapons to the
M-19. (217) The DA thereby created a marriage of convenience-albeit a
tenuous one-between two unlikely partners in crime, who until then had
been deadly enemies.

Ravelo and Bassols were among the four Cuban officials indicted by a
federal grand jury in Miami on November 15, 1982, using Guillot's
trafficking infrastructure. The other two were identified as René
Rodríguez Cruz, the ICAP president and a PCC/CC member; and Vice Admiral
of the Cuban Navy Aldo Santamaría Cuadrado (a.k.a. "René Baeza
Rodíguez"), also a PCC/CC member. (218)

The perilous threat posed to Colombia's democratic system by the
narco-guerrilla alliance was demonstrated dramatically on November 6,
1985, when the M-19, desperate for publicity to reaffirm its "vanguard"
status and protest the government's peace process, seized Bogotá's
Palace of Justice. The M-19 also wanted to destroy extradition records
of narcotics traffickers and terrorize the judiciary. It accomplished
the later two objectives, although the Betancur government's unexpected
military counterattack resulted in one of the most violent denouements
in the annals of terrorist hostage incidents. About fifty hostages,
seventeen soldiers and security personnel, and the thirty-five
terrorists were killed in the twenty-eight hours of fierce fighting.
According to hostage witnesses, one of the Cuban-trained leaders of the
operation. Andrés Almarales, personally "executed" most of the eleven
judges who died in the incident, although confirmation was lacking.

As elsewhere, on of the DA's objectives in Colombia has been to unify
the half-dozen or so rebel groups. To this end, DA agents arranged a
mid-1980 meeting of representatives of Colombia's various subversive
groups in order to discuss a common strategy and tactics. The meeting
resulted in increased practical cooperation, if not agreement, on a
unified strategy. (219)

The Cubans also began training M-19 members in rural guerrilla warfare
tactics in Cuba. In early 1981, some 150 of these Cuban-trained M-19
members were flown to Panama, were armed by the G-2 chief, General
Manuel Noriega, and PDF members, and then were shipped by boat through
the Panama Canal to two locations on Colombia's Pacific coast. (220) The
poorly organized operation failed, however, and most of the rebels were
captured and confessed their Cuban sponsorship. After Cuba admitted as
much, Colombia suspended diplomatic relations. (221) In September 1984,
the DA reportedly informed the M-19 that if it did not merge with the
Colombian CP, at least strategically, the M-19 would no longer receive
Cuban-Soviet support. (222) Disagreement over acceptance of President
Belisario Betancur's peace offer resulted, however, in internecine
warfare between groups advocating continued "armed struggle" and the
CP-affiliated Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), the
country's largest guerrilla organization. The FARC used the truce to
launch a political party and reorganize its guerrilla fronts.

In June 1985, six of the Colombian guerrilla organizations-the M-19,
National Liberation Army (ELN), the Maoist Popular Liberation Army
(EPL), and three smaller groups-signed a unity of action accord, setting
the stage for a renewed terrorist campaign. (223) The M-19 also led
efforts to form the transnational America Battalion with Ecuador's
Alfaro Lives (AVC) group; Peru's SL and Tupac Amaru Revolutionary
Movement (MRTA); and other groups in Nicaragua, El Salvador, Costa Rica,
Panama, Venezuela, and Uruguay. (224)

The entire Colombian guerrilla movement, including the FARC, M-19, ELN,
EPL (Camilist Union), the Quintin Lame Command, and the Workers
Revolutionary Party (PRT), established the Simón Bolívar Guerrilla
Coordinating Board in October 1987, (225) Although unity has continued
to elude the Colombian groups, the FARC's thirty guerrilla fronts and
those of the other organizations have become a major insurgency threat
to the government of democratically elected President Virgilio Barco Vargas.

Six FARC deserters revealed in August 1987 that various FARC fronts have
Cuban advisers attached to them. (226) Other deserters reported that
Cubans also are working as advisers and instructors for the ELN and are
directing its ecologically and economically disastrous sabotage of oil
installations. (227) Numerous ELN kidnappings of oil company officials
and a powerful ELN car-bomb that blew up in front of the U.S. Occidental
Petroleum Company in Bogotá in February 1988 demonstrated the terrorist
trend of the ELN campaign.

The kidnapping of President Belasario Betancur's brother, a magistrate,
by the ELN in November 1983 provided the first opportunity for Fidel
Castro to reveal himself as the godfather of Colombia's terrorist
groups. After the kidnapping provoked a storm of national indignation,
Castro, at the urging of President Betancur, publically called on the
ELN to release its hostage. The ELN complied almost immediately,
dropping all of its ransom demands.

After the M-19 kidnapped presidential candidate and former ambassador to
Washington, Alvaro Gómez Hurtado, in May 1988, Colombian officials again
had to appeal to Castro. The Colombian press reported that Minister
César Gaviria Trujillo travelled to Havana secretly in early July and
arranged direct negotiations between the Colombian government and the
M-19. (228) The M-19 released Gómez fifteen days later, after further
negotiations conducted in Panama.

Ecuador

The AVC, a pro-Cuban Marxist-Leninist organizations carried out
kidnappings, assassinations, bombings, and various other terrorist
actions following its emergence in August 1983. (229) Although Cuban
involvement, if any, was not reported, the Cuban chargé d'affaires in
Quito at that time was José Francisco Ross Paz, a DA agent. The AVC
targets included the U.S. presence in Ecuador. In May 1984, the AVC
threw a small bomb over the U.S. embassy wall in Quito, and another at a
U.S. binational center in Guayaquil in June 1985. (230) A clone of the
Colombian M-19 , the AVC has ties to Nicaragua, Cuba, and Libya. When
Ecuadorean police captured AVC leader Rosa Cárdenas in September 1984,
she was carrying documents indicating that she had been soliciting $3
million (U.S.) in funds and training support from Nicaragua and Libya.
(231) The AVC's links to Nicaragua prompted Ecuador to break diplomatic
relations with the Sandinista regime on October 11, 1985. The government
also had established that from thirty to forty AVC rebels were trained
in Nicaragua between 1979 and 1983. A few other AVC members were trained
by the FMLN in El Salvador. (232) By mid-1986, Ecuadorean security
forces had rendered the AVC ineffective. AVC leaders reportedly held a
"summit" in Nicaragua in mid-1987 in an attempt to regroup and
reorganize, but in late 1988, the AVC was demanding an amnesty. (233)

Peru

The Cubans and the Sandinistas have been linked to the MRTA, a rapidly
expanding Castroite urban terrorist organization that specializes in
anti-U.S. actions. The MRTA's suspected Cuban-Nicaraguan connection
emerged soon after the group began operating in late 1984. Peruvian
security forces raided an MRTA training camp near Cuzco on November 27
and claimed to have seized weapons, olive-drab military uniforms, and
medicines identified as having originated in Cuba and Nicaragua. (234)
Former MRTA leader Luís Varese Scotto is reported to have fought with
the FSLN against the Somoza regime and to have undergone guerrilla
training in Cuba in 1981. (235) Furthermore, a Cuban agent, "Erasmo
Dupierre," is reported to have arrived in Lima on December 1, 1984, and
to have spent a week holding secret meetings with MRTA leaders,
particularly Varese, to plan pre-election political-military strategy. (236)

Unlike the SL's often indiscriminate terrorism, MRTA terrorism has been
selective. In July 1985, the MRTA announced that it would focus its
actions on "imperialistic" (i.e., U.S.) targets. For example, in April
1986, the MRTA detonated a car-bomb outside the U.S. ambassador's
residence in Lima to protest the U.S. air raid on Libya. (237) MRTA
terrorists attacked the U.S. embassy in Lima in early November 1986,
bombed the Eastern Airlines office in January 1987, and fired two 60-mm
rockets at the residence of the U.S. ambassador in June 1988.

Chile

The DA began to reactivate the MIR in the second half of 1979 by
stepping up urban guerrilla warfare training of MIRistas in Cuba and
assisting the highly trained members to reinfiltrate Chile. (238) By
late 1980, at least 100 Cuban-trained MIR terrorists had re-entered
Chile and resumed "armed propaganda" (terrorism). The Chilean CP (PCCh),
for its part, began re-evaluating its traditionally non-violent line
after the FSLN's seizure of power in Nicaragua.

During talks in Havana in December 1980, Fidel Castro and Manuel Piñeiro
urged PCCh leader Luís Corvalán to establish a unified Chilean
opposition. (239) Corvalán subsequently informed the PCC Congress in
Havana of his party's new line, which called for "armed struggle"
against the Pinochet dictatorship in coordination with the MIR and other
extremist groups. (240) A Radio Moscow broadcast of March 2, 1985,
transmitted the decisions of the PCCh's January 1985 Plenum to use all
means, including armed violence, against the Pinochet regime and to
support its "allied organization," the Manuel Rodríguez Popular Front
(FPMR). (241) Experts generally regarded the FPMR as a terrorist front
for the PCCh, at least until seventy percent of the FPMR allegedly broke
away from the party in November 1986. (242)

In the mid-1980's, a systematic bombing campaign by the MIR and FPMR has
plagued the Santiago area, causing frequent blackouts. Since 1982, U.S.-
associated facilities in Chile have become the target of increasing
bombing attacks (over two dozen). In 1984 alone, the FPMR perpetrated a
claimed 735 bombings. In 1985, it began using remote-controlled car
bombs as powerful as fifty kilograms. From October 1984 through November
1985, it claimed responsibility for eleven car bombings, including one
outside the U.S. consulate in Santiago in July 1985. On April 29, 1986,
the FPMR exploded a 15-kilogram bomb at the U.S. ambassador's residence
in Santiago to protest the U.S. air raid on Libya. (243)

Chilean terrorists carried out 1,729 bombings and incendiary attacks
between January 1, 1985 and April 30, 1986. The bombing campaign
escalated in 1984 following the clandestine return to Chile of Chilean
extremists who had undergone training in Cuba, Nicaragua, and Libya.
(244) At a world terrorist conference held in Managua in February 1986,
MIR Secretary General Andrés Pascal Allende (Salvador Allende's nephew)
requested facilities for the training of MIR members in Nicaragua, as an
extension and supplement to those already existing in Cuba. (245)

The degree to which Cuba and the Soviet Union are committed to
overthrowing the Pinochet government by "armed struggle" was revealed on
August 6, 1986, when Chilean authorities discovered the first of ten
FPMR arms caches, totaling seventy tons (the largest stash of weapons
ever secretly amassed by extremists in a Latin American country). The
Soviet equipment had been manufactured recently in Bulgaria; the U.S.
weapons were traced, according to U.S. experts, to former U.S.
stockpiles sent to South Vietnam in the late 1960s. (246) Some of the
twenty-one individuals captured in connection with the FPMR arsenals,
including four Cuban-trained FPMR members, told authorities of meetings
in Nicaragua, training in Cuba, and months of preparation to receive the
weapons, which arrived in two batches in July 1986. (247)

A State Department official confirmed that U.S. experts had positively
established that Cuba sent the weapons. (248) According to Chilean
officials, more than 200 individuals participated in transferring the
weapons from Soviet and Cuban merchant or fishing ships into chartered
Chilean fishing boats, and then in carrying them ashore in rubber
dinghies (Zodiacs). (249) Chilean authorities also reported that Cuba,
Nicaragua and the Soviet Union provided $20 million through an
International Guerrilla Coordinating Committee (CCGI) to finance the
landing of weapons and explosives in the northern zone of Chile and the
subsequent failed assassination attempt made by the FPMR against General
Pinochet. In that action on September 7, 1986, fifteen FPMR terrorists
attacked the General's motorcade with grenades and automatic weapons,
killing five members of the presidential guard and wounding ten military
escorts. (250)

According to Chile's director general of Investigative Police, both the
FPMR and MIR receive urban guerrilla training in Cuba at the Punto Cero,
Pinar del Rio, Trinidad, and Havana camps. The official added that Cuba
provides logistical support, whereas the Soviet Union gives them
financial and propaganda assistance, and other aid comes from Nicaragua
and Libya. (251) Chile's Attorney General Ambrosio Rodríguez reported on
January 22, 1988 that Cuban and Nicaraguan agents were commanding a
newly created International Guerrilla Coordinating Board (presumably the
CCGI) that had politically reunited the MIR and FPMR under Cuban
command. He added that MIR and FPMR cadres were being trained in Cuba
and East Germany. (252)

Bolivia

Cuba's reinvolvement in Bolivia, fifteen years after the Guevara fiasco,
began formally in October 1982 when Cuban officials attended the
presidential inauguration of Hernán Siles Zuazo. By late 1983, sixty to
seventy Cuban agents reportedly were operating in Bolivia, trying to
build a support base among the smaller Marxist Leninist groups and
providing guerrilla training and weapons for their members. (253) The
subversive efforts of the Cubans reportedly were being directed by DA
official Angel Burgez (sic), the charge d'affaires at the Cuban
consulate in La Paz, and another DA agent, Manuel Basabe, a political
counselor at the consulate. (254) The chargé d'affaires was actually
Angel Brugues Pérez. (255) According to the Latin news media, Brugues
has "vast experience in coordinating revolutionary activities" and was
arrested in Brazil nine years earlier for smuggling machine guns. (256)
Revelations of Cuban subversive activities in Bolivia were reported in
La Paz newspapers in 1983. One Bolivian arrested by the army affirmed
that groups of fifteen to twenty Bolivians each were being flown by
Cubana Airlines from Lima to Havana for three-month training programs in
rural and urban guerrilla warfare at the "Comandante Ché" Camp, run by
the MININT near Havana. (257) An unusual number of Cuban diplomatic
couriers reportedly traveled from Lima to La Paz in 1984, carrying many
crates immune to inspection. (258) In addition, DA "second chief"
Armando Campos Ginesta visited La Paz twice in 1984. Ironically, the
more conservative administration of Víctor Paz Estenssoro reestablished
full diplomatic relations with Cuba in September 1988.

THE UNITED STATES

Puerto Rico

With the demise of U.S. radicals, Castro's surrogate terrorists in the
United States have become Puerto Rican separatists. Puerto Rican
terrorist groups were responsible for 55 percent of domestic terrorist
group incidents in the United States during the 1980-86 period. (259)
Many Puerto Rican extremists are known to have received terrorist
training in Cuba. Dr. Daniel James testified before a U.S. Senate
Subcommittee that the DGI, working through Filiberto Ojeda Ríos,
organized the Armed Forces of National Liberation (FALN) in 1974. (260)
Ojeda Ríos' association with the DGI actually begin in 1961, according
to a U.S. Senate Judiciary Report. (261) In October 1974, he was
arrested and charged with terrorist acts against American hotels in
Puerto Rico. Authorities found a substantial amount of Cuban government
documents and secret codes in his possession. He jumped bail soon
thereafter, however, and disappeared for many years. (262) He was,
however, credited with the 1979 unification of Puerto Rico's five
principal terrorist groups into the Cuban-directed National
Revolutionary Command (CRN). (263)

According to the former chief investigator of the U.S. Senate, Alfonso
Tarabochia, the DA began directing terrorist activities in Puerto Rico
and the eastern and midwestern United States as early as 1974. (264)
That June, the secretary general of the Puerto Rican Socialist Party
(PSP), Juan Marí Bras, met in Havana with Fidel Castro to consolidate
party solidarity, according to testimony by a PSP specialist. Montané
and Piñeiro also received the PSP delegation. (265) On January 26, 1973,
the PSP opened its permanent offices in Havana and, by 1974, was
"operating as a branch of the Cuban intelligence and espionage
apparatus." (266)

Beginning in September 1974, the incidence of terrorist bombings by
Puerto Rican extremists, particularly the FALN, escalated sharply.
Targets included U.S. companies and public places. For example, the FALN
was responsible for a powerful blast that killed four patrons and
wounded dozens at the historic Fraunces Tavern in lower Manhattan on
January 25, 19754. Later that year, Castro sponsored the First World
Solidarity Conference for the Independence of Puerto Rico in Havana. A
day after the Second World Solidarity meeting, held in Mexico from
November 30 to December 2, 1979, the Macheteros celebrated the
machine-gunning a U.S. Navy bus in Sabana Seca, Puerto Rico, killing two
sailors and seriously wounding ten others with AK-47 fire.

Since 1978, the Macheteros has been one of the most active of the more
than half-dozen Puerto Rican terrorist groups. The Organization of
Volunteers for the Puerto Rican Revolution (OVRP) also has claimed
responsibility for several of the same attacks. (267) In January 1981,
Macheteros commandos destroyed nine U.S. military jet fighters, worth
$45 million, at the Muñiz Air National Guard Base in San Juan.
(Cuban-trained Salvadorian FMLN commandos duplicated the action a year
later in El Salvador.)

The FBI reported that the Macheteros, in attacks on federal buildings in
Puerto Rico in 1983-85, used U.S.-made M-72 antitank weapons that were
known to have been transferred by Vietnam to Cuba after the United
States pulled out of the Vietnam war. (268) In an operation that the DA
reportedly supported with training and weapons, the Macheteros robbed a
Wells Fargo depot in Hartford, Connecticut, of $7.2 million on September
12, 1983. Federal authorities who were quoted by Insight magazine
explained that following the heist, Macheteros leaders Ojeda Ríos and
Jorge Farinacci García disagreed on how to the money. Ojeda Ríos wanted
to turn over all of it to Cuba, whereas Farinacci insisted that at least
$2.5 million remain in Puerto Rico; Faranacci's faction won out. (269)
According to the FBI, $4 million from the theft was sent to Cuba and the
operation's ringleader, Macheteros member Victor Manuel Gerena, employed
as one of the Wells Fargo guards, was given sanctuary in Cuba. (270)

In September 1985, the FBI announced the capture in Puerto Rico Ojeda
Ríos and eleven reputed Macheteros members. (271) The U.S. indictment
against Ojeda Ríos reportedly provides documentation that he and other
Macheteros leaders maintained contact in Mexico with Fernando Comas, the
DA official who coordinated the Sandinista guerrillas from the Cuban
consulate in Costa Rica. The Macheteros leaders and Comas reportedly
discussed what to do with the $7.2 million Wells Fargo loot. (272) After
being held for thirty-two months in pretrial detention, Ojeda Ríos was
released on $1 million bail in May 1988.

That June, The Mexican government placated the Castro regime but angered
U.S. officials by releasing Ojeda's FALN comrade William "Guillermo"
Morales from prison and putting him on a plane to Havana, where he was
granted asylum. One of the most dangerous and fanatical of the Puerto
Rican separatists, Morales had escaped from custody in New York in 1979
while serving ninety-nine years on terrorist bombing and murder charges
and fled to Mexico, where he was captured after a gun battle in which he
killed a policeman.

Having made the cause of Puerto Rican independence a priority of Cuban
foreign policy for many years, Castro has a loyal following among the
separatists. After an unexplained fifteen-year delay, Cuba "officially
inaugurated" the PSP's permanent offices in the exclusive Miramar
district of Havana in April 1987; Piñeiro and Montané received PSP
Secretary General Carlos Gallisá Bisbal on that occasion, just as they
had met with his predecessor in 1973. (273)

VIII. DA / DGRE FOREIGN POLICY INFLUENCE

Despite the central roles played by the DGRE and DA in Cuba's worldwide
subversive program and foreign policies, and despite reports in Granma
of important meetings held by these officials, Cubanologists generally
have not devoted much attention to analyzing their roles and influence.
Those analysts have long assumed, quite erroneously, that the overt,
diplomatic side of Cuban foreign relations is all that needs to be
examined in order to understand Cuba's foreign policy.

One of the few scholars in academia to at least note the existence of
the DA and the DGRE, Juan del Aguila, opined that they probably only
implement and oversee policies made by the PCC's Politburo. (274)
Although the DGRE and DA no doubt follow general policy guidelines set
by the Politburo, they probably also have a significant role in
formulating revolutionary policies that are appropriate to the
particular conditions existing in a country or region, not to mention
their important diplomatic as well as covert activities. After all,
numerous Cuban ambassadors were previously identified as DA officials.
The DGRE and DA, in effect, carry out Fidel Castro's covert foreign
policy, the one that seeks to unify, coordinate , and support
self-described anti-imperialist "national liberation movements" worldwide.

Juan Valdés Paz, an official of the DA's CEA, summed up that policy
toward Latin America in a 1984 paper presented in Mexico City. Valdés
stated that "...the foreign policy of the Cuban revolution has had as a
permanent objective the achievement of unity in Latin America and the
Caribbean and has offered all its support to any action leading toward
such unity." (275) This "unity" that Valdés was referring to was not the
unity of Latin American nations. Rather, he stated explicitly and
candidly that the permanent Cuban objective was the unity of
"revolutionary movements." Such a policy is not formulated by the
Ministry of Foreign Relations (MINREX), but by the PCC/CC's
revolutionary support apparatus, namely the DGRE and DA. Foreign
Minister Isodoro Malmierca performs only the ceremonial or traditional
diplomatic aspects of Cuban foreign policy, such as relations with
Western states. The DA and DGRE chiefs normally meet with as many
foreign leaders or representatives of foreign parties or groups as
Malmierca does.

As DGRE chief or simply by virtue of his Politburo membership, Jorge
Risquet, unlike former DGRE chief Montané, may have some bureaucratic
authority over the DA and Piñeiro. In some meetings that Risquet held
with delegations from Latin American countries, the presence of Piñeiro
was noted. DA officials other than Piñeiro also were present in meetings
that Risquet has held with visitors from Latin America. For example, DA
official José Fernández Vilela attended Risquet's meeting with the
Uruguayan Labor Minister in November 1986. The DGRE also apparently has
some bureaucratic representation in MINREX. For example, Granma
identified Oscar Fernández Padilla as both vice minister of foreign
relations and chief of section of the DGRE. (276)

Risquet greatly outranks Malmierca, but Piñeiro also appears to have
considerably more influence with Fidel Castro on foreign affairs than
does Malmierca. According to Castro biographer Tad Szulc, the post of DA
chief is "one of the most powerful political positions" (277) In
addition to serving as Castro's chief aide on Latin American
revolutionary affairs, Piñeiro, also a PCC/CC member, is reported to be
his key adviser on Cuban policy toward the United States. (278) Szulc
has personally observed that Piñeiro, whose beard is now white, is
invariably present at social functions held in the Palace of the
Revolution, "usually standing near Castro with a small group of the top
leadership," and "has permanent access to Castro's third-floor office."
(279)

Piñeiro's frequent meetings with visiting leaders of Latin American
guerrilla and terrorist groups, CPs, and opposition parties or Socialist
regimes are noted occasionally by the Cuban media. For example, Havana
television reported that Piñeiro received Ecuadorean leftist politician
Abdala Bucaram Ortiz at Havana's airport on May 20, 1988. (280)

According to Mallin, Piñeiro has approval authority over all diplomatic
appointments in the hemisphere below the rank of minister-counselor, as
well as the authority to appoint ambassadors in key countries. (281)
Mallin mentioned, however, that DA official Pedro Silvio González Pérez
was the minister counselor in Georgetown, Guyana, which would suggest
that the minister-counselor rank is also within Piñeiro's appointive
powers. Mallin also has reported that DA officials are present in every
Cuban diplomatic mission in Latin America and the Caribbean, as well as
at the United Nations in New York. According to Mallin, every Cuban
diplomatic post, as well as the Cuban missions in Washington, D.C. and
the UN, has two or three DA officials, and in some key countries there
are five or six agents. (282)

Aspillaga affirmed that DA officials occupy even the highest-level posts
within Cuba's foreign diplomatic missions, and that at least half of the
sixty-five to seventy Cubans assigned to the Cuban mission at the U.N.
and all Cubans assigned to the twenty-member Cuban Interests Section in
Washington, D.C., are intelligence agents posing as diplomats. (283) DA
officials have held ambassadorships in at least seven countries:
Barbados, Columbia, Dominica, Jamaica, Nicaragua, Suriname, and St.
Lucia. As the country profiles in this report demonstrate, DA
ambassadorial appointments usually indicate that the host country is a
special target for subversion by the Cubans. In the early 1980s, the
subversive activities of DA operatives resulted in ruptures in Cuban
diplomatic relations with Colombia, Costa Rica, Jamaica, and Suriname.
None of these countries had re-established diplomatic relations with
Cuba by October 1988.

IX. THE SOVIET-CUBAN DIPLOMATIC GAMBIT

As a result of Castro's considerable skills as an elder statesman and
the DA's sophisticated, covert approach to supporting subversive
activities in the Americas, many Latin American democratic leaders
apparently are willing to believe that Cuba gave up exporting revolution
in favor of reentering the Latin American community or have hoped that
normalization of relations with Cuba will appease the left in their own
countries.

Castro's opportunity to break out of the growing diplomatic isolation in
which Cuba found itself in 1981 came with the 1982 Falkland/Malvinas
Islands war between Argentina and Britain. While the United States
backed Britain, Castro gained diplomatic support in Latin America by
siding with Argentina. And despite Castro's humiliating setback in
Grenada in October 1983, Cuba's diplomatic standing began to improve in
1985 as Bolivia and Uruguay restored full diplomatic relations with
Cuba. Far more significantly, Brazil, the region's largest country, did
the same in 1986. The DA could take some of the credit for Cuba's
rapprochement with Brazil. DA agent Sergio Cervantes, in his capacity as
an envoy of the Castro regime, is reported to have engaged in extensive
lobbying of Brazilian government officials. (284) Brazil's Foreign
Ministry, however, rejected Castro's appointment in August 1986 of a
senior subversive agent, Colonel René Rodríguez Cruz, to serve as one of
Cuba's top two diplomats in its future embassy in Brasilia after the O
Estado de Sao Paulo newspaper published an incriminating photograph of
Rodríguez. The photo, which was provided by Armando Valladares-a Cuban
writer and former political prisoner-showed Rodríguez holding an
automatic pistol and standing over the body of a man who apparently had
just been "executed." (285) Valladares told the newspaper in an
interview that Rodríguez, as ICAP director, is responsible for Cuba's
intelligence operations abroad, and that Brazil ranked second only to
Mexico as the most important country for Castro's subversive plans.

The Soviet regime of CPSU leader Mikhail Gorbachev began actively
courting influential non-Marxist nations in Latin America in
1986-principally Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico, but also Panama and
Uruguay. (286) Gorbachev's approach, however, appeared to differ little
from the 1960s when the Soviets allowed the Cubans to support "armed
struggle" in selected Latin American countries of no diplomatic or trade
interest for the Soviet Union, while Moscow pursued diplomatic and
commercial objectives in the larger countries. "Favored"countries such
as Mexico already have seen how the sizeable "diplomatic" presence of
the Soviets, like the Cubans, can become an internal security threat. (287)

X. CONCLUSION AND OUTLOOK

Although the Monroe Doctrine promulgated in 1823 may now be obsolete,
the principle of preventing extrahemispheric threats to this hemisphere
has remained a fundamental tenet of both U.S. and inter-American
security policies and interests during the 20th century. It is the basis
of the Inter-American (Rio) Treaty on Reciprocal Military Assistance of
1947, which President Kennedy invoked in the 1962 missile crisis.
Independently of any Monroe Doctrine, the prohibition against foreign
interference in the hemisphere and the right to defend against it is
recognized by international law and the UN Charter. The latter provides
for regional defense arrangements such as those specified in the Rio
Treaty and the OAS Charter. Just as the Cubans use Nicaragua and the
various Marxist-Leninist groups as their proxies, The Soviet Union
employs Cuba and the CPs as its surrogates. Thus, these surrogate forces
within the region constitute, ipso facto, an extrahemispheric threat.

Isolating Cuba from its Nicaraguan and Soviet allies, not simply from
the non-Communist countries, will be essential if the United States ever
hopes to rectify its past policy mistakes and contain and eventually
eliminate the threat posed by the Soviets' use of Cuba as a strategic
platform and the fountainhead for subversion, guerrilla warfare, and
terrorism in the hemisphere. Conversely, isolating Nicaragua from its
Cuban, other Soviet bloc, and Libyan allies will be a prerequisite to
dealing effectively with the Cuba problem. The growing Soviet bloc
threat in Central America will inevitably develop into a strategic
crisis for the Americas if the subversive and military efforts of Cuba
and Nicaragua continue unchecked.

Indeed, anti-U.S. and anti-government Castroite terrorism in Latin
America will likely increase and could very well spread to Panama. In
May 1988, the FMLN vowed to launch a new terrorist campaign against
Americans in El Salvador. The Sandinista regime is likely to fulfill the
"robot" role assigned it by the Cubans. For example, in a July 1987
speech marking the eight anniversary of the Sandinista takeover,
President Daniel Ortega threatened that he might follow Castro's lead by
providing arms to revolutionaries and terrorists in Haiti and Chile, as
well as those in Puerto Rico. (288)

Weapons used by the Castroite groups will become increasingly
sophisticated and lethal as foreign terrorist techniques and
technologies are assimilated, with Cuban and Nicaraguan assistance.
Nicaraguan defector Major Roger Miranda stated publicly on December 12,
1987 that Soviet and Cuban officials were planning to discuss the FMLN's
request for SA-7 antiaircraft missiles at a meeting scheduled for
mid-November 1987 in Havana. He added that, although the Nicaraguans
were training fifteen FMLN guerrillas to use the shoulder-fired
missiles, Nicaraguan Defense Minister Humberto Ortega preferred that the
Cubans handle the transfer of the weapons to the FMLN. (289) When Duarte
confronted Daniel Ortega with the charge in mid-January 1988, the
Nicaraguan leader threatened to provide the SA-7 missiles to the FMLN if
the U.S. Congress approved new aid to the Contras. (290)

Castroite terrorism can be expected to revisit Puerto Rico in coming
years. In 1987, according to federal authorities, Puerto Rican
terrorists-funded by $4 million in proceeds from the Wells Fargo
robbery-were reportedly undergoing extensive training in Cuba and
Nicaragua in preparation for a new wave of violence. The expected
targets included U.S. military personnel and equipment in Puerto Rico,
as well as federal and local law enforcement authorities working there.
Cubans and Nicaraguans were believed to be operating the training camps,
but Libyans and Bulgarians also were suspected of providing some of the
training. (291)

Given Cuba's current targets of opportunity in Colombia, Panama, and
Central America, Castro is not likely to launch a terrorist campaign in
the continental United States anytime soon without a significant
pretext, such as U.S. military action against Nicaragua. If that
happened, according to Miranda, Cuban and Nicaraguan forces would also
try to "regionalize" the conflict in Central America by carrying out
military operations against Nicaragua's neighbors and U.S. facilities in
the region, including capturing U.S. personnel and property and
destroying the U.S. embassy in San José, Costa Rica. In any event,
Castro clearly intends to continue using the Latin American and Puerto
Rican Marxist-Leninist groups as well as his Nicaraguan "robot" to wage
his surrogate terrorist war against the Americas.
APPENDIX 1

CITED DA OFFICIALS
Arbesú Fraga, José Antonio - A vice chief
Abreu Quintana, Ramiro - Chief, Central American Section
Arteaga Hernández, Damian - First Secretary, Buenos Aires
Bassols Suárez, Gonzalo - Former First Secretary, Bogotá
Brugues Pérez, Angel - Chegé d'Affaires, La Paz
Barahona López, Andrés
(aka "Renán Montero Corrales") - Chief, Nicaragua's Fifth Directorate of
Intelligence
Cabrera, Roberto - A section chief
Campos Ginesta, Armando - A vice chief
Cárdenas Junquera, Oscar Osvaldo - Former Cuban Ambassador, Suriname
Carranza Valdés, Julio - A CEA official
Cervantes, Sergio - Brazil desk
Comas Pérez, Fernando Pascual - A CEAL official
Cordova Rivas, Omar Ramón - Caribbean Section Chief
Díaz Evarista, Gastón - Served in Grenada
Díaz Larrañaga, Carlos Andrés - Killed in Grenada
Estrada Fernández, Armando Ulises - A former vice chief
Fernández Vilela, José - An official
Fernández de Oña, Luis - A Section chief
García Almeida, Alfredo - Chief, North American Section
González Piñeiro, Pedro ("Justo") - An advisor
González Pérez, Pedro Silvio - Minster-Counselor, Georgetown
Hernández Curbelo, Norberto - Ambassador to Nicaragua
Hernández Ojeda, Luis - Cuban Chargé d'Affaires, Managua
Hernández, Rafael - Director, CEA's United States Research Dept.
López Díaz, Julián - Former Ambassador to Managua
Ojalvo, José Luis - An official
Piñeiro Losada, Manuel - Chief, DA
Ravelo Renedo, Fernando - A vice chief
Ross Paz, José Francisco - Chargé d'Affaires, Quito
Suárez Salazar, Luis - Director, CEA
Valdés Paz, Juan - A CEA official
Villar Martínez, Ilya Felicia - Director, CEAL

APPENDIX 2

BIOGRAPHICAL PROFILE

Manuel Piñeiro Losada ("Barba Roja" -Red Beard)

As chief of the DA and a member of the PCC/CC, Piñeiro is responsible
for developing and implementing Cuba's political-military revolutionary
program in the Americas. The son of a bar owner in Matanzas Province,
Piñeiro probably was born in the 1920s. He is said to be a nephew of
Cuba's Communist poet Nicolas Guillén.

Piñeiro studied business administration at Columbus University in New
York in the early 1950s and was married to an American ballet dancer,
Lorna Nell Burdsall, whom he later divorced. The bearded Piñeiro has
been described by Jay Mallin as tall and slim, with a "hard, raucous
voice." He joined Fidel Castro's 26th of July Movement and served in a
column of Raul Castro's Second Front. After Castro took power, Major
Piñeiro was named chief of the Army in Oriente Province. Castro
hand-picked him to serve on the Revolutionary Tribunals, formed to
convict forty-three pilots and airmen guilty of "genocide." As one of
Castro's most loyal supporters, Piñeiro became vice minister of the
MININT in the autumn of 1959. That September he and G-2 chief Raúl
Valdés Menéndez, whom he subsequently replaced, met with KGB official
Vadim Kotchergine. In the early 1960s, according to Juan Vivés, a former
Cuban security official, Piñeiro belonged to Valdés Menéndez's Fifth
Bureau, which was composed of a small group of Cubans (whose identities
were secret) and a large number of KGB advisers. In those days, Piñeiro
was almost always accompanied by a KGB official named "Ivan."

By 1962 Piñeiro was chief of the newly established DGI. The Soviets
forced him out of the position in 1968, however, because of his loyalty
to Castro and his role in thwarting a KGB/PCC conspiracy to oust Castro.
The grateful Cuban leader then appointed Piñeiro head of Cuba's National
Liberation Directorate (DLN). In November 1974, Piñeiro was named DA
chief, a position that he has held since then. A close adviser and
confidant of Fidel Castro, Piñeiro is known to be audacious and smart.

BOOK REFERENCES

Barron, John. KGB: The Secret Work of Soviet Secret Agents. New York:
Bantam Books, 1974.

Bethel, Paul D. The Losers. New Rochelle, N.Y.: Arlington House, 1969.

Castro Hidalgo, Orlando. Spy for Fidel. Miami: E.A. Seeman Publishing,
Inc., 1971.

Dobson, Christopher and Ronald Payne. The Carlos Complex. London:
Coronet Books, 1977.

Dorschner, John and Roberto Fabricio. The Winds of December. New York:
Coward, McCann & Geoghegan, 1980.

Falk, Pamela S. Cuban Foreign Policy: Caribbean Tempest. Lexington,
Mass.: Lexington Books, 1986.

Fauriol, Georges, ed. Latin American Insurgencies. Washington, D.C.:
Georgetown University Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1985.

Franqui, Carlos. Diary of the Cuban Revolution. New York: Viking Press,
1980.

Halperin, Maurice. The Taming of Fidel Castro. Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1981.

Matthews, Herbert L. Fidel Castro. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1970.

Revolution in Cuba. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1975.

Moss, Robert. Chile's Marxist Experiment. Newton Abbot: David & Charles,
1973.

Ratliff, William E. Castroism and Communism in Latin America, 1959-1976.
Washington/Stanford: AEI-Hoover Policy Studies, 1976.

Robbins, Carla Anne. The Cuban Threat. Philadelphia: ISHI Publications,
1985.

Sterling, Claire. The Terror Network. New York: Holt, Rinehart &
Winston, 1981.

Suarez, Andres. Cuba:Castroism and Communism 1959-1966. Cambridge,
Mass.: MIT Press, 1967.

Szulc, Tad. Fidel: A Critical Portrait. New York: William Morrow &
Company, 1986.

Thomas, Hugh. The Cuban Revolution. New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1977.

Vives, Juan. Les Maitres de Cuba. Paris: Robert Laffont, 1981.

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

ENDNOTES

1. As cited by Herbert L. Matthews, Fidel Castro (New York: Simon &
Schuster. 1969), p.121.

2. For example, this myth is promoted in Carla Anne Robbins' The Cuban
Threat (Philadelphia: ISHI Publications, 1985); Wayne S. Smith's The
Closest of Enemies: A personal and Diplomatic Account of U.S.-Cuban
Relations Since 1957 (New York and London: W.W. Norton & Co.,1987 and
Jorge D. Dominguez's "Cuba in the 1980s," Foreign Affairs, Fall
1986,p.130. The thesis that Cuba's State-to-State relations have taken
precedence over subversion and support of the left is also positioned by
Damian J. Fernandez, Cuba's Foreign Policy in the Middle East (Boulder,
Colorado: Westview, 1988.)

3. Pamela S. Falk, Cuban Foreign Policy: Caribbean Tempest (Lexington,
Mass.: Lexington Books 1986), p.24.

4. Jiri and Virginia Valenta, "Soviet Starategies and policies in the
Caribbean Basin," in Wiarda, Howard J. and Mark Falcoff, eds., The
Communist Callenge in the Caribbean and Central America (Washington,
D.C.: American Enterprise institute, 1987),p. 79. This essay is
essential reading for a comprehensive overview of Soviet-Cuban
activities in the region.

5. U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1986, October
1987,pp. 1,3, 24-25.

6. Richard Halloran, "Latin Guerrillas Joining Forces, U.S. Officers
say," New York Times, March 3,1987; and "Guerrilla Forces '25,000
strong', " Latin American Weekly Report, November 5, 1987, p. 5, citing
an 'exclusive' briefing By U.S. Southcom senior officers.

7. Ibid.

8. Ibid.: and U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, Soviet
Activities in Latin America and the Caribbean, Current Policy No. 669,
February 28, 1985.

9. U.S. Departments of State and Defense, The Soviet-Cuban Connection in
Central America and the Caribbean, march 1985, p.10.

10. Hugh Thomas, The Cuban Revolution ( New York: Harper & Row
Publishers, 1977), pp. 218-219.

11. See Edward Schumacher, "Castro Said To Have Shunned '59 Anti-Samoza
Bid," New York Times, December28, 1986, p.13, Citing a news conference
given by Gutiérrez.

12. Georgie Anne Geyer, "Clearly Visible Origins," Wasington Times,
December 17, 1987, citing her interview with Fausto Amador.

13. See the OAS Security Report of 1962 in U.S. Congress, House,
Committee on Foreign Affairs, Castro-Communist Subversion in the Western
Hemisphere, 88th Cong., 2d Sess., 1963, Appendix 1 , p. 272.

14. Brian Crozier, "Soviet Pressure in the Caribbean: The Satellisation
of Cuba," Conflicts Studies, no. 35 (may 1973).

15. The letter, published in Bogatá newspapers on October 17, 1963, is
noted by Paul D. Bethal, The Losers (New Rochelle, N.Y.: Arlington
House, 1969), p. 424.

16. Andres Suárez, Cuba: Castroism and Communism, 1959-1966 (Cambridge,
Mass.: MIT Press, 1967), pp. 143-146.

17. See U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, Internal
Security Subcommittee, The Tricontinental Conference of African, Asian,
and Latin American Peoples, 1966.

18. Maurice Halperin, The Taming of Fidel Castro (Berkeley: University
of California Press, 1981), p. 189.

19. Senate, Tricontinental, P, 84.

20. Christopher Dobson and Ronald Payne, The Carlos Complex (London:
Coronet books, 1997 ), p. 36; and Claire Sterling, The Terror Network;
the Secret War of International Terrorism (New York: Holt, Rinehart &
Winston, 1981), p. 15.

21. Dobson and Payne, Ibid., p.36.

22. "'Ché' Guevara fought in Africa, Cuban Colonel says, "French Press
Agency, Washington times, October 6,1987, p.A9.

23. Robert Moss, Chile's Marxist Experiment ( Newton Abbot; David &
Charles, 1973) ,p. 111.

24. Orlando Castro Hidalgo, Spy for Fidel (Miami: E.A. Seemann
Publishing, Inc., 1971) pp. 48-49.

25. John Barron, KGB: The Secret Work of Soviet Agents (New York: Bantam
Books, 1974),p.205; and U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on the
Judiciary, Internal Security Subcommittee, Hearings , Part 20 Communist
Threat to the United States through the Caribbean, October 16, 1969, p.
1425. citing the testimony of DGi defector Orlando Castro Hidalgo.

26. Barron, KGB, p. 206.

27. Barron, KGB, pp. 203-204; also see U.S. Senate investigator Alfonso
L. Tarabochia's testimony in U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on the
Judiciary, Internal Security Subcommittee, Terroristic Activity ; The
Castro Connection in Puerto Rico: Castro's Hand in Puerto Rican and U.S.
Terrorism, 97th Cong. 1st Sess., Part 6,July 30, 1975, p. 379.

28. U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, The role of Cuba
in International Terrorism and Subversion, 97th Cong,. 2nd Sess., 1982,
p. 9.

29. Ibid.

30. Senate, Communist Threat, p. 1426.

31. D.L. West, "Cuba III," Tecnología Militar [Bonn] 3 (1983), pp. 145-146.

32. Peraza testimony, op cit, p. 7.

33. Ibid.

34. Peraza, p. 12.

35. Ibid., p. 9.

36. Senate, Communist Threat, p. 1426.

37. U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, Cuba's Renewed
Support for Violence in Latin America, Special Report No. 90, December
14, 1981, p. 12.

38. Sterling, Terror Network, p. 11.

39. State Dept., Cuba's Renewed Support, p. 11.

40. Ibid.

41. James Theberge, "Kremlinn's hand in Chile." Soviet Analyst, August
15, 1974. As reprinted by U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Foreign
Affairs, United States and Chile During the Allende Years, 1970-73,
1975, p.636.

42. Moss, op cit, p.111.

43. Ibid.

44. Fernández was last reported in 1976 as chief of an unidentified DA
Section. CIA, Directory, November1985, p. 8.

45. For a copy of the letter, see OAS, Special Consultative Commission
on Security, The Marxist-Leninist Process in Chile, 1974, pp. 233-234.

46. Nathaniel Davis, The last two years of SalvadorAllede (Ithaca, New
York: Cornell University Press, 1985), pp.184-185.

47. Ibid

48. As cited by León Gouré and Morris Rothenburg, Soviet Penetration of
Latin America (Coral Gables: University of Miami Press, 1975), p. 111.

49. Robert S. Leiken, "Fantasies and Facts: The Soviet Union and
Nicaragua," Current History (October 1984),p.315.

50. For Example, see Everett G Martin,"Latin America's Terrorist
Network," Wall Street Journal, April 15, 1980, p. 24.

51. State Dept., Cuba's Renewed Support, p. 12.

52. CIA, Directory, November 1985.

53. Ibid., pp. 8, 221.

54. Mallin, "Cuban Intelligence Elite," op cit.

55. Sterling, Terror Netwok, p. 110.

56. State Dept., Cuba's Renewed Support, p. 11.

57. "Worldwide Terrorist Activities Are Planned and Financed by
International HQ in Paris," The Times [London], October 18, 1977.

58. Sterling, p. 110, citing Economist Foreign Report,March 23, 1977.

59. For the text of the final communiqué, see William E. Ratliff,
Castroism and Communism in Latin America, 1959-1976
(Washington/Stanford: AEI-Hoover Policy Studies, 1976), Appendix D, pp.
217-232.

60. For excerpts, see Lester A. Sobel, ed., Castro's Cuba in the 1970's
(New York: Facts on File, 1978), pp.169-170.

61. Christopher S. Wren, "Soviet Union and Cuba Promise More Aid for
Guerrilla Groups," New York Times, April 9, 1977.

62. State Dept., Cuba's Renewed Support, p. 4.

63. Ibid.

64. Mallin, "Cuban Intelligence elite," op cit.

65. CIA, Diectory, pp. 7-8.

66. State Dept., Cuba's Renewed Support, p. 4.

67. Ibid.

68. Jay Mallin, "How Cuban Agents Deliver Arms to Leftist Guerrillas in
El Salvador," Washington Times, August 22, 1983, p.A1.

69. Jay Mallin, "Cuban Intelligence Elite Pushes Subversion in the
Americas" Washington Times, August 25, 1983, p.7A.

70. State Department, Cuba's Renewed Support, p. 10.

71. "Special Report on Cuba ,"Foreign Report, November 7, 1979, p.2.

72. See the excerpts from an interview with Bolaños in Uri Ra'anan,
Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, et alia, eds., Hydra of Carnage (Lexington,
Mass.: Lexington Books, 1986), p. 315.

73. United States Information Agency, Radio Martí Program, "The
Defection of a MININT Official, " Cuba--Quarterly Situation Report,
Third Quarter 1987, p. V-13. Also see Radio Martí Program's Interview
with Aspillaga, August 1987, Tape 1, Side 2, p.4.

74. Bill Gertz, "Defector Charges Castro Poking Nose in U.S. Race,"
Washington Times, March 25, 1988, p.A3.

75. Carlos Franqui, Diary of the Cuban Revolution (New York: Viking
Press, 1980).

76. CIA Directory, 1987, p.7; Mallin "Elite," op cit.

77. Jorge I. Domínguez, "Cuba's International Arena," Latin America
Research Review, v.23, no. 1 (1988), p.202.

78.CIA Directory, June 1987, p. 8.

79. Alfred Padula, "Cuba, as Always, Sparks Much Interest at LASA," The
Times of the Americas, April 6,1988, p.5.

80. CIA, Directory,pp. 9, 235.

81. CIA, Directory, June 1987, pp. 10-11.

82. On Montané, see: Herbert L. Mathews, Fidel Castro (New York: Simon &
Shuster, 1970), pp. 65-5, 73; Mathews, Revolution in Cuba (New York:
Charles Scribner's Sons, 1975), pp. 16,51,53,253; Hugh Thomas, The Cuban
Revolution (New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1971), pp. 39,91; K.S.
Karol, Guerrillas in Power (NewYork: Hill & Wang, 1970), p. 311; John
Dorschner and Robert Fabricio, The Winds of December (New York: Coward,
McCannand Geoghegan, 1980), pp. 170,445; and Franqui, Diary, pp. 49-55,528.

83. USIA, Radio Martí Program, Cuba-Quarterly Situation Report: First
Quarter 1987, p.VI-9.

84. Granma, March 30, 1988, p.8; and FBIS, vol. 6, June 13, 1984, citing
Havana Domestic Services.

85. Roger Fontaine, "Cuba-Backed Fronts Evade U.S. Embargo," Washington
Times, May 23,1986, p. 1A; Roger Fontaine and James Morrison, "Defector
Brings Insider's View From Havana, Washington Times, July 29, 1986.

86. CIA, Directory, June 1984, pp. 8,13; and June 1987, p. 11.

87. State Dept., Cuba's Renewed Support, p. 5.

88. Castro Hidalgo, p.106.

89. Jim and Virginia Valenta, "Sandinistas in Power." Problems of
Communism, September-October 1985, p.5. FSLN veterans are also known to
have received training at PLO camps in Lebanon and Libya beginning in
the early 1970s. See U.S. Department of State, The Sandinistas and
Middle Eastern Radicals, August 1985, pp. 1-2,6.

90. State Dept., Cuba's Renewed Support, p. 6.

91. Ibid.

92. "Special Report," Foreign Report, p. 7.

93. State Dept., Cuba's Renewed Support, p. 5; and Granma, March 28, 1979.

94. U.S. Department of State and Defense, Background paper: Nicaragua's
Military Build-up and Support for Central American Subversion, July 18,
1984. p. 12.

95. Ibid.

96. For the Costa Rican Special Legislative Commission Report see
"Panamanian, Cuba Involvement in Arms Traffic Reported, "Latin America
Report, Joint Publications Research Services (JPRS), June 17, 1981,
#78316, pp.19-23.

97. State Dept., Cuba's Renewed Support, p.8.

98. Ibid.

99. See, for example, "Castro said trying to unify Central American
Guerrillas," FBIS, vol. 6, July 6, 1979, p. P3.

100. For example, Ernest Evans, in his Monograph "Revolutionary Moments
in Central America: The Development of a New Strategy," in Howard J.
Wiarda, ed. Rift and Revolution: The Central American Imbroglio
(Washington: AEI, 1984), pp.178-180, contends inaccurately that the
"Sandinista model" was developed by the FSLN.

101. As cited by Jiri Valenta, "The USSR, Cuba, and The crisis in
Central America," Orbis 25 (31)(Fall 1981), p. 734.

102. As cited by C.G. Jacobsen, "The Jacobsen Report: Soviet Attitudes
Towards, and contacts with, Central American Revolutionaries," U.S.
Department of State External Research Program, April 10, 1984, p.10.

103. Communist Parties Signal Major Changes," Latin American Weekly
Report (London), December 12, 1980, pp.9-10.

104. Schafik Jorge Handal, "Power, the Character and Path of the
Revolution and Unity of the left," Communist affairs [UK], no. 2 (1982),
pp. 240-241.

105. For example, FSLN and Cuban delegations attended the July 1984
meeting of South American CPs in Buenos Aires. See, "Statement By A
Meeting of the Communist Parties of South America," Information Bulletin
(Toronto), October 1984, p.32.

106. See Manuel Piñeiro Losada, "The Present Crisis of Imperialism and
the Revolutionary Process in Latin America and the Caribbean," Cuba
Socialista [Havana: PCC/CC], no. 4 (September-November 1982), pp. 15-53.

107. Ibid., p. 52.

108. Ibid., p.50.

109. As cited by Dr. Kenneth Skoug, Jr., Director of Office of Cuban
Affairs. See U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, The
United States And Cuba, Current Policy No.646, December 17, 1984, p.3.

110. "Diplomatic Relations Established with Nicaragua," Latin America
Report, FBIS, vol. 6, July 30, 1979, p.Q1, citing Havana Radio.

111. State Dept., Cuba's Renewed Support, p.6.

112. Robert Moss discusses the visit in U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee
on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Security and Terrorism: The Role of
Moscow and it's Subcontractors, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., June 26, 1982, p.11.

113. See Moss's testimony in Role of Moscow, pp.11,49.

114. Ibid.

115. From his testimony in U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Labor and
Human Resources, Subcommittee on Alcoholism and Drug Abuse, Drugs and
Terrorism, 1984 98th Cong., 2nd Sess., August 2, 1984, pp. 83-84.

116. U.S. Departments of State and Defense, Backround paper: Nicaragua's
Military Build-up and Support for Central American Subversion, July 18,
1984. p. 11.

117. Drugs and Terrorism, pp. 83-84.

118. U.S. Departments of State, Inside the Sandinista Regime: A Special
investigator's perspective (Washington, D.C.: USGPO, February 1986), p. 16.

119. As pointed out by Bruce Fein and Albert Blaustein, "Nicaragua's
Constitution: Echos of Mein Kampf," Freedom at Issue, March/April 1987.
p.38.

120. Bolaños interview, op cit, p.317.

121. Fontaine, "Cuban-Backed fronts," op cit.

122. U.S. Department of State, "Revolutions Beyond our Boarders" :
Sandinista Intervention in Central America, Special Report No. 132,
September 1985, p.4.

123. Castro Hidalgo, Spy for Fidel, op cit, p.101.

124. "Inside Communist Nicaragua: The Miguel Bolaños Transcripts,"
Backgrounder (The Heritage Foundation), no. 294, September 30, 1983, p.8.

125. U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, Strategic
Situation in Central America and the Caribbean, Current Policy no. 352,
December 14, 1981, p. 6.

126. Hydra of Carnage, p.317.

127. Ibid.

128. "Nicaragua's Secret Police," Foreign Report, December 5, 1985, p.
1: and Bolaños interview, Hydra, p.314.

129. Don Oberdorfer and Joanne Omang, "Nicaragua bares plans to
discredit Foes," Washington Post, June 19, 1983, p.A1.

130. Jiri and Virginia Valenta, "Sandinistas in power," Problems of
Communism, September/October 1985, p. 12, citing an interview with Bolaños.

131. Washington Times, June 30, 1987. citing the General's Radio Martí
Interviews.

132. For an example of Cerna's brutal interrogation techniques, see
testimony of a victim in the U.S. Department of State, Human Rights in
Nicaragua Under the Sandinistas: From Revolution to Repression, 1986, p. 83.

133. Bolaños interview, Hydra, p. 312.

134. FBIS, vol. 6, March 7, 1987, p. 11, citing Managua Domestic Service.

135. FBIS, vol. 6, March 18, 1988, p. 23, citing La Prensa [Managua],
March 15, 1988, p.1.

136. FBIS, vol. 6, July 16, 1986, p.15, citing Radio Sandino.

137. Background Paper, p. 31; and Juan O. Tamaya, "World's Leftists find
a haven in Nicaragua," Miami Herald, March 3, 1985,p.A1.

138. Bolaños, Hydra, p. 316.

139. Dennis Volman, "What the Cubans are doing in Nicaragua," Christian
Science Monitor, November 23, 1984.

140. Bolaños interview, Hydra, p. 315.

141. Granma, October 14, 1987, p. 1.

142. Washington Post, August 13,1987, p. A32.

143. USIA, Radio Martí Program, Quarterly Situation Report, Third
Quarter 1987, pp.17-18.

144. Granma, November 2, 1987, p.1.

145. State Dept., Cuba's Renewed Support, p.6.

146. "Leftist Organizations Send Message To Castro," FBIS, vol. 6, May
30, 1980, pp. P7-P9.

147. State Dept., Cuba's Renewed Support, p.6.

148. Organization and Evolution of the Salvadoran Insurgent Movement,"
Bulletin of the U.S. Department of State (May 1982), p. 75.

149. Ibid.

150. State and Defense Depts., Background Paper, p. 17, citing Canadas's
interview with the State Department officials on March 12, 1984.

151. See U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, Communist
Interference in El Salvador, Special Report No. 80, February 23, 1981.

152. State Dept., Revolution Beyond, p. 17.

153. Tom Díaz, "Salvadoran Rebel Defectors Reveal Cuba, Managua Roles,"
Washington Times, May 21, 1985.

154. "Salvadoran Rebel leader Cites Cuban, Managua Aid," Washington
Times, April 30, 1985.

155. James LeMoyne, "Captured Salvadoran Rebel Papers List Training
Classes Overseas," New York Times, May 21, 1985, p. 11.

156. Roger Fontaine, "Castro Says Military Aid to Rebels Will Go On,"
Washington Times, April 18, 1985.

157. "Manuel Piñeiro Receives Group," FBIS, vol. 6, October 28, 1985, p.
Q2, citing Havana Television Service.

158. Granma, January 24, 1987, p. 1.

159. "President Duarte on Cuban Involvement in Attack," FBIS, vol. 6,
April 13, 1987, p. P4, citing a San Salvador television report.

160. Washington Times, September 10, 1987.

161. Granma Weekly Review, June 8, 1980, p. 1.

162. State Dept., Cuba's Renewed Support, p.7.

163. "Guatemala's Four main Rebel Groups Join Forces," New York Times,
March 3, 1982.

164. "State Dept., Revolution Beyond, p. 13.

165. Ibid.

166. See Guy Gugliotta, "Cuba Trains Guerrillas at Secret Military
Base," Miami Herald, September 11, 1983, p. A1; Sandinistas, Cuba
Training Guerrillas, Honduran Says," Miami Herald, January 24, 1984"and
Loran Jenkins,"Honduran army Defeats Cuban-Trained Rebel Unit,"
Washington Post, November 22, 1983, p. A1.

167. State Dept., Revolution Beyond, p.15.

168. FBIS, vol. 6, July 22, 1988, p. 22. Citing ACAN.

169. FBIS, vol. 6, May 15, 1981, p. P1; May 28, 1981, pp.P9-P10; and
September 14, 1983, p. P3.

170. State Dept., Revolution Beyond, p. 17.

171. Ibid, pp. 17-18.

172. "Deputy Minister on Leftists Training in Cuba," FBIS, vol. 6. July
30, 1985, citing La Nación [San José] , July 21, 1985.

173. State Dept., Revolution Beyond, p. 17.

174. U.S. Department of State, Inside the Sandinista Regime: A Special
Investigator's Perspective, February 1986, p.17.

175. FBIS, vol. 6, November 28, 1975, citing Panama City Television.

176. See, for Example, FBIS, vol. 6, June 12, 1975, p. N1.

177. Jay Mallin, "Cuba Unit Fans Flames in Latin America," Washington
Times, August 26, 1983, p. 5A.

178. FBIS, vol. 6, August 4, 1981, p. N7, citing the French Press Agency.

179. Valentas, "Soviet Strategies in the Region," p. 112, citing La
República [Panama City], October 16, 1981.

180. Lewis H. Diuguid, "Chilean Officials Waste Funds, Defector Says,"
Washigton Post, August 11, 1987: and John McCaslin, "Intelligence
Officer Who Defected Says Castro Lives in Lap of Luxury," Washigton
Times, August 11, 1987.

181. Latin America Weekly Report, October 1, 1982, p.4.

182. Jay Mallin, "Cuban Intelligence Elite Pushes Subversion in
Americas," Washington Times, August 25, 1983, p. 7A.

183. Roger Fontaine, "Cuba-Backed Fronts Evade U.S. Embargo," Washington
Times, May 23, 1986, p. 1A.

184. Joe Pichirallo, "Cuba Used Noriega to Obtain High-Tech U.S. Goods,
Defector Says," Washington Post, August 12, 1987, p. A7.

185. Washington Times, February 8, 1988, p. A10.

186. Lena Williams, "Defecting Panamanian Pilot Says Noriega Is Storing
Cuban Arms," Washington Post, March 21, 1988.

187. James M. Dorsey,"Cuba Helps Plant Seeds of War," Washington Times,
March 21, 1988.

188. Lou Marano, "Panamanian Envoys Ask U.S. To Send Troops, "
Wadhington Times, March 23, 1988, p. A11.

189. Lou Marano, "Marxist Brigade Infiltrates Panama to Defend Noriega,"
Washingon Times, April 5, 1988, p. A1.

190. James M. Dorsey and Lou Marano, "Cuban Presence Grows in Panama,"
Washingon Times, April 14, 1988, p. A1.

191. David E. Pitt, "Noriega Reported to Be 'Leaning Heavily' on Cuban
Advisors," New York Times, April 1988.

192. "Cuban Presence Grows," op cit.

193. "Cuban Presence Grows," op cit; DA positions added from CIA
Directory, June 1987, pp. 7-8.

194. "Cuban Presence Grow," op cit.

195. State Dept., Cuba's Renewed Support, p. 9.

196. Congressional Record, June 18, 1987, P. H5245.

197. Carl Stone, "The WPJ and the PNP," Daily Gleaner [Kingston],
December 24, 1984.

198. "Cuba Accepts the Invitation to attend WPJ Congress," FBIS, vol. 6,
November 29, 1984, pp. S4-S5, citing CANA.

199. U.S. Department of State, Grenada: A Preliminary Report, December
16, 1983, p. 7.

200. State Dept., Cuba's Renewed Support, p. 10.

201. Congress, The Role of Cuba, pp.14-15; and Robert Moss, "Capital
Hill Visitor is a Spy For Castro," The London Daily Telegraph, September
3, 1979.

202. CIA, Directory, p.226.

203. U.S. Departments of State and Defense, Grenada Documents: An
Overview and Selections, September 1984, Documents #33,39.

204. Ibid., Doc. #17.

205. Granma, November 14, 19 83, p.8.

206. CIA, Directory, pp.8, 223, 229.

207. Don Bonning, "Suriname: Denies It's Edging Into Havana's Caribbean
Orbit," Miami Herald, January 19, 1983.

208. David S. Harvey, "Suriname: Cuba's New Conquest," Defense & Foreign
Affairs, November 1983, p. 40.

209. James LeMoyne, "Strongman Finds Suriname Isn't Easily Subdued," New
York Times, January 19, 1984.

210. Edward Dew,"Did Suriname Switch?" Caribbean Review, vol. 12, no.2
(Fall 1983), p. 29.

211. Jackson Diehl, 'Suriname Keeps Foreign Policy In Balance, "
Washington Post, October 13, 1983, p. A28.

212. Edward Codey, "Castro Ties to Drugs Suggested," Washington Post,
May 1, 1983.

213. James Michel, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for
Inter-American Affairs, Additional Submission on Colombian Drug
Traffickers And the Cuban Connection, "in U.S. Congress, Senate,
Judiciary Foreign Relations Committees, Subcommitteees on Security and
Terrorism and Western Hemisphere Affairs, The Cuban Government's
Involvement in Facilitating International Drug Traffic, 98th. Cong.,
1st. Sess., April 30, 1983, p. 684.

214. Diego and Nancy Asencio, Our Man Is Inside: Outmaneuvering the
Terrorists (Boston: Little, Brown, 1982), p. 7.

215. Asencio, Our Man Is Inside, p. 231.

216. Michel, Cuban Government's Involvement, p. 684.

217. Ibid., p.687.

218. Mary Thorton, "Four Cuban Officials Indicted in Drug Smuggling,"
Washington Post, November 6, 1982, p. A1; and Jim McGee, U.S. Indicts
Four Castro Officials on Drug-Trafficking Conspiracy," Miami Herald,
November 6, 1982, p. 1.

219. State Dept., Cuba's Renewed Support, p.10.

220. Seymour Hersh, "Panama Strongman said to Trade in Drugs, Arms and
Illicit Money--U.S. Aids Also Assert Noriega helps Leftist Rebels in
Colombia," New York Times, June 12, 1986.

221. Granma Weekly Review, March 22, 1981, p. 6.

222. "Cuba Seeks Communist Party, FARC, M-19 Alliance," FBIS, vol. 6,
October 1984, p. F1, citing El Tiempo [Bogatá], October 1, 1984, p. 2A.

223. "Seven Rebel Groups Sign Unity of Action Accord," FBIS, vol. 6,
June 27, 1985, p. F1, citing El Siglo [Bogata], June 20, 1985, p.1.

224. See for Example, "Three-Nation Rebel Military Front Uncovered,"
FBIS, vol. 6 August 30, 1985, p. F1, citing AFP; and MRTA Confirms Links
to Colombians, Ecuadorians," FBIS, vol. 6, March 4, 1986, p. j2, citing EFE.

225. "Guerrilla Groups Unite, Issue Statement," FBIS, vol. 6, October
23, 1987, p. 27, citing La Hora [Montevideo], October 11, 1987, p.5.

226. El Tiempo, August 3, 1987, pp. 1A, 9A.

227. El Siglo [Colombia], January 30, 1988, p. 5.

228. See El Tiempo and El Espectador, July 5, 1988.

229. For details, see Robert Thomas Baratta, "Political Violence in
Ecuador and the AVC, " Terrorism, vol. 10, no. 3 (1987), pp. 165-174.

230. Mallin, "Cuban Intelligence Elite," op cit.

231. Arrested Guerrilla Reveals Vast Subversion Plan, " FBIS, vol. 5,
September 6, 1984, p. G2, citing the German Press Agency.

232. Roger Fontaine, Ecuador Ahead in its Battle With Terrorism."
Washington Times, January 14, 1986; and "Police Say AVC Members Trained
in Libya." FBIS, vol. 6, December 22, 1986, pp. G1-2.

233. "Police Report on Guerrilla 'Summit," FBIS, vol. 6, June 26, 1987,
p. P1, citing the Spanish Press Agency.

234. Oiga [Lima], December 17, 1984, pp. 13-18.

235. Ibid.

236. Oiga, February 4, 1985, pp. 25-27.

237. FBIS, vol. 6, April 22, 1986, p. J1.

238. State Dept., Cuba's Renewed Support, p. 11.

239. "Castro meets with Chilean communist party official," FBIS, vol.6,
December 9, 1981, p. Q2.

240. Granma, December 27, 1981,p. 1.

241. "Situation in Chile," Bulletin of the U.S. Department of State,
July 1985, p. 85.

242. See, for example, Paul Sigmund's article on the PCCh in Richard F.
Star, ed., Yearbook on International Communist Affairs 1986: Parties and
Revolutionary Movements (Stanford University, Stanford, California:
Hoover Institution Press, 1986), pp. 64-66.

243. FBIS, vol. 6, April 30, 1986, p. E1.

244. "Situation in Chile," Bulletin of the U.S. Department of State,
July 1985, p. 88.

245. El Mercurio [Santiago], February 14, 1986, and September 21, 1986.

246. El Mercurio, August 15, 16, 21, and 23, 1986, p. A1, and August 12,
1987, p. A1; and Shirley Christian, "Chile Arms Caches are laid to Cuba
", New York Times, October 19, 1986, p. 21.

247. Bradly Graham, "Arms Caches in Chile Prompt Reassessment of Rebel
Might," Washigton Post, September 17, 1986.

248. Omang, op cit, citing Robert S. Gelbard, deputy assitant secretary
of state for South African affairs.

249. El Mercurio, August 28, 1986, p. A1; and Graham, op cit.

250. "Special Report: The Terrorist Connections in Chile," El Mercurio,
November 27, 1986, p. C7.

251. El Mercurio, May 26, 1987, p. A1, 10, citing Chilean police
official Fernando Paredes Pizarro.

252. FBIS, vol. 6, January 27, 1988, p. 27, citing Santiago Domestic
Services.

253. Jay Mallin, Sr., "Cubans Find a Fertile Field for Subversion,"
Washigton Times, March 2, 1984.

254. Ibid.

255. CIA, Directory, p.223.

256. "Cuban 'diplomatic couriers' seen sowing subversion in Latin
America," JPRS, February 26, 1985, pp. 1-2, citing El Tiempo [Bogotá],
November 27, 1984, which summarizes a press review in La Estrella
[Panama], January 14, 1985, p. 11.

257. Guerrillas reportedly receiving training in Cuba," FBIS, vol. 6,
August 22, 1983, pp. C1-C2, citing El Diario [La Paz ], August 18, 1983.

258. "Cuban 'diplomatic couriers'," JPRS, op cit.

259. Federal bureau of investigation, Analysis of Terrorist incidents in
the United States, 1986 (1987), pp. 14, 53, and 56.

260. Senate, Role of Cuba, op cit, p. 167.

261. Senate, The Castro Connection, pp. 467-468.

262. Diego A. Abich, "Puerto Rico's Struggle with Cuban Supported
Terrorism," Wall Street Journal, May 9, 1986, p. 27.

263. Daniel James, "Puerto Rico's terrorists: a real threat to Reagan?"
Dallas Morning News, December 27, 1981, p. G1.

264. U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, Internal
Security Subcommittee, Terrorist Activity: The Castro Connection in
Puerto Rico: Castro's Hand in Puerto Rican and U.S. Terrorism, 94th
Cong., 1st Sess., Part 6, July 30, 1975, p. 379.

265. See testimony of Francisco Martinez, a specialist in the PSP, in
Senate, TheCuban Connection, pp. 355, 357.

266. Ibid., pp. 353, 338.

267. Karl Schoenberger, "Puerto Rican Group Vows New Attacks," Hartford
Courant, November 8, 1985, p. 10.

268. Ronald J. Ostrow, "Weapons Used by Terrorists tied to Cuba," Los
Angeles Times, September 4, 1985, p. 1.

269. Jerry Seper, "The Cuban Spark in Puerto Rico," Insight, February 2,
1987, p. 29.

270. AP, "12 Arrested in 1983 Heist that totaled $7 Million," Washington
Post, August 31, 1985, p. A13.

271. Ostrow, op cit.

272. Abich, op cit.

273. Granma, April 9, 1987, p. 2.

274. Juan M. del Aguila, "Revolution and Foreign Policy-Making: How Cuba
Influences Nicaragua," in Steven W. Hughes and Kenneth J. Mijeske,
Politics and Public Policy in Latin America (Boulder: Westview, 1984),
mp. 166.

275. Juan Valdéz Paz, "Cuba and Crisis in Central America, "
Contemporary Marxism 10 (1985) , p.58.

276. Granma, April 11, 1987, p. 95.

277. Tad Szulc, Fidel: A Critical Portrait (New York: William & Morrow &
Co., 1986), p. 617.

278. As noted by Jim Hoagland in his interview with Castro, op cit.

279. Szulc, p. 74.

280. FBIS, vol. 6, May 23, 1988, p. 2.

281. Jay Mallin, "Cuban Intelligence Elite Pushes Subversions in
Americas," Washington Times, August 25, 1983, p. 7A.

282. Ibid.

283. Joe Pichirallo, "Cuba Used Noriega to Obtain High-Yech U.S. Goods,
Defector Says," Washington Post, April 27, 1988, ,p. A24.

284. Olga Nazario, "Brazil's Rapprochement with Cuba: The Process and
the Prospect," Journal of Interamerican Studies & World Affairs, vol 28,
no. 3 (Fall 1986), p .78.

285. See O Estado de S. Paulo, August 31, 1986, p. 1.

286. Bill Keller, "Soviet, in a Shift, Expands Contact With Third World,
"New York Times, May 25, 1987.

287. See, for example, "The Plot to Destroy Mexico," in Barron, KGB, pp.
312-348.

288. Washigton Times, August 10, 1987.

289. Joe Pichirallo and Terry Shaw, "Top Defector Disillusioned By
Marxism, Washington Post, December 13, 1987, p. A1.

290. Josette Shiner, "Ortega Levels Missile Threat At El Salvador,"
Washington Times, January 29, 1988, p. A1.

291. Jerry Seper, "Managua Aids Puerto Rican Terror Schools, "Washington
Times, January 13, 1987.

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